Elizabeth Barrett Brownings Poetic Style Essays -- Essays Papers

Elizabeth Barrett Brownings Poetic StyleElizabeth Barrett Brownings numbers has been the subject of much criticism. Her elusive style prompted many critics to question Barretts method of writing. In fact, some(prenominal) critics, like Alethea Hayter, go so far as to propose that an h sensationst critique of her work must admit that she often wrote very bad poetry indeed (15). Accusations against Barretts work were often targeted at her tendency for anonymity, her excessive development of thoughts, unsuccessful forced rhymes, and more often than any other of her familiarities, her tendency to acquire her own words. Despite being relatively shunned by the world of poetry, Barrett persisted in writing poetry, even though the majority of her writing time just business leader have been spent on defending her work rather than writing it.John Forster has remarked, She uses all her thoughts and feelings for whatever she does. The art of knowing what to leave out she has not attained(19) . In defense of her work Barrett writes in a letter to her husband, Robert Browning, I do not say everything I think (as has been said of me by master-critics) but I take every means to say what I think(19). Hayter recognizes that Barretts work was surely not lacking revision, but was the product of aeonian reconsideration. She was said to have revised after every printing. For Barrett, the main focus of revising was to iron out metre, find perfectly fitting words for her lines, and to train literature that read with the movement of natural speech. However, Hayter admits that this consistent going over of her work to find just the right word was what weakened Barretts work and organize it into rather exhaustive explanations of what she purposed to convey to her re... ...of womens talk Arose and fell and tossed about a spray Of English Ss, soft as a silent hush, And, not withstanding, sort of as audible As louder phrases thrown out by men(26).Saintsbury, who earlier criticized B arretts rhyming technique, confessed that her ear for metre was, in fact, wonderful (24).Elizabeth Barrett Browning was one of the braver literary pioneers. Choosing to utilize the vocabulary she favored rather than submit to the harsh criticisms of those who held the power to make or break her is an applaudable novelty about her. some(prenominal) writers, having been successful in their literary exploits, are susceptible to accusations that their work was catered to critics. Surely, this cannot and should not be said of Elizabeth Barrett Browning.Works CitedDonaldson, Sandra, Critical Essays on Elizabeth Barrett Browning G.K. Hall & Co., naked York, NY.

The Slums Of West County :: essays papers

The Slums Of West County It was our first day of freedom. On April 10, 1998, my best friend Laren and I were anxiously ready to move out on our own. We had been planning this for months, while sitting at Dennys for a few hours at a time. We were trying to figure out how much we would each pay in rent, bills, and food. Where we might live and what kind of rules we might have to keep us from killing each other (as way of lifemates are prone to do) were other issues we resolved. So, now the deuce sheltered West County girls were going to have a taste of life on their own but not too far away from mama and Dad, just in case something went awry. The coarse, beautiful homes we lived in no longer felt big enough for us, or rather, maybe they felt too big for us. We had picked an apartment complex that was only about five or ten minutes away from our parents and our jobs. Now we had the task of moving 20 years of collect boxes to an empty, different room. A room that was half t he size of our own have sexrooms we lived in now. We had been spoiled little girls and we were just starting to realize it. Two bedrooms and two baths seemed analogous it would eliminate many problems that roommates often have over sharing a bathroom or bedroom. We had a small kitchen, a decent sized family room with a cable hookup, and a living room connecting the other two. Upon seeing the model apartment the management had decorated, we thought our place would be well outlay the money. Neither of us thought we could make such a heinous mistake. After all, we were still located in West County or were we? At 730 on that moving day morning, I felt anxious to get started. My stomach was screaming complaints at me for being so inconsiderate as to only feed it a breakfast of coffee and nicotine. I knew I had three hours until my friends would be here with the U-Haul, but my nerves were jumping already. I pitch down my coffee mug in the sink, made a sprint for the stairs, and e nded up in my bedroom doorway to find my stepfather already unscrewing the bed frame.

Cognitive Radio Essay -- Technology

A problem go about cognitive radio is the need for accurate estimations of performance metrics. Performance estimation algorithms are limited when facing new situations. For example, heuristics, such as genetic algorithms (GA), require specific companionship about the interference conditions in order to adapt fitness functions. This paper presents an data-based stick out approach that analyzes performance results of a small set of configurations to create an empirical model. The method overcomes the need for specific intimacy of the channel or stochasticity environment and is capable of addressing new situations.parThis problem is difficult given the limitations inherent in any theoretical system model and the complexity of sensing the radio set environment. Existing GA-based cognitive engines identify radio configuration settings based on mathematical models for defining objective functions citeRondeau2007. The methods swear on additional knowledge of noise conditions in order to customize the objective functions to the current environment. Advancements in the decision-making architecture tied case-based reasoning to the GA in order to increase time-to-decision and make for advantage of past experiences citeHe2009. However, CBR relies on the assumption that a past decision will work in the current situation if the dickens are similar enough. In both methods, the identified solutions true performance is unknown until after it is implemented on the system.parTheoretical models of wireless performance rely on assumptions in the channel conditions, and often do not represent the actual situation. In contrast, statistical methods base all conclusions from empirical evidence without requiring knowledge of the channel or interference conditions. T... ...rameters settings are then pared down by repeating the DOE with focus on another response meter. This process is perennial for each response meter available until a final parameter setting is identified. The authors developed a reconfiguration algorithm that draws its decision from multivariate DOE summary on the system. The algorithm was implemented on an open-source software controller for off-the-shelf 802.11 wireless cards citeWeingart2007.parIn contrast, we implement RSM experimental design that leads to quadratic models as opposed to linear. This approach increases accuracy and identifies overall better solutions. We implement the techniques on a software defined radio platform much indicative of deployable cognitive radio. Our focus emphasis the statistical fit performance of different designs and contrasts performance to a reference heuristic engine.

Shirley Jacksons The Lottery and Kate Chopins The Story of an Hour Es

Shirley Jacksons The Lottery and Kate Chopins The study of an HourThe Lottery by Shirley Jackson, and The chronicle of the Hour by Kate Chopin, both have similarities and differences when it comes to the elements of literature. Particularly, when the authors use foreshadowing to manipulate the moods of the stories and add irony to cleverly deceive the reader. Both of these stories possess similarities and differences when it comes to their components of the baloney, specifically the authors drill of elements of mood and the tone of irony. In Shirley Jacksons The Lottery, irony is a major theme. This story is about a town full of elitist snobs that are stuck on their tradition of a lottery, even though it is a grim ritual and rather detrimental to the people in the town. The characters are honoring a tradition that is handed sight to them from former generations. The reader is led through the outwardly normal and charming little village, and is taken on a ride of ironic horror as they slowly grasp the annual fate of one the village?s inhabitants. The title ?The Lottery? implies a contest with a winner of some kind, comparable a sweepstakes. When in reality the winner is actually the loser or person that will die by stoning. At the beginning of this story, the main character, Mrs. Hutchinson, is in favor of the lottery. The atmosphere of the town is casual yet anxious. Mrs. Hutchinson arrives late because she ?clean forgot? what mean solar day it is. This seems quite impossible to any reader that anyone would forget a day like lottery day. Her procrastination is reasonable exactly her excuse is lame. Mrs. Hutchinson complains that her husband, Bill, ?didn?t have enough time to choose.? And that the results of the drawing were not fair. In these statements, she is implying that the other villagers had more than time to choose, and in fact given an advantage over the Hutchinson family. In reality, time had little to do with the drawing of the ?slips of pap er.? As soon as they hands the second drawing, Mrs. Hutchinson is chosen. This is the climax of irony of this story. Mrs. Hutchinson is chosen for the lottery. She is shocked and astounded, having believed that she couldn?t possibly be chosen for the lottery. She begs or mercy, but the townspeople are strict with belongings to their traditions and her pleas of mercy fall on deaf ears and she is stoned to death. ?... ...the mention of her health. However, in ?The Lottery? the reader knows that something bad will eventually happen, but the reader has no idea who the ill-fated winner is going to be. I feel that ?The Story of an Hour? is a better example of the elements of irony and foreshadowing than ?The Lottery.? In ?The Story of an Hour? the author uses a writing style that is easy to follow and simple to understand. The plot is orderly and follows a sequential order of events. The imagery is vivid, but is it easy to understand and doesn?t confuse the reader. ?The Lottery? was no t an adequate story. The foreshadowing was presented in an irksome fashion, and the language confused and baffled me. ?The Lottery? was unwieldy to follow, and I was unable to understand anything about it until I had completed the story. In closing, I feel that Kate Chopin did a superb job with ?The Story of an Hour? in reaching her audience on a level that made it simple to understand her story and to have a sense of perceptive knowledge of how the story would end. Works CitedJackson, Shirley. The Lottery. The Harper Anthology of Fiction. Ed Sylvan Barnet. New York HarperCollins, 1986. 862-868

The Cemetary and Loss in Faulkner’s The Sound and Fury Essay -- Faulkn

The Cemetary and Loss in Faulkners The Sound and FuryOn the sixth pageboy of the novel The Sound and The Fury, Caroline Compson informs her son Jason that she and her other son Benjy are going to the cemetery. The sense of loss that runs through much of Faulkners work, especially The Sound and The Fury, evict be found in the quiet, black-and-white world of the dead. In a cemetery one is reminded of lives lost and lost lives. Faulkner honors both in his novel. The story reveals a multilayered cacophony of loss. The trees and the grave stones in the Laurel Grove cemetery have been around for a long time. So has the Compson family. Yet, I get the impression education The Sound and The Fury that time is running out for Faulkners fictional dysfunctional family. By the end of the story the...

The Cemetary and Loss in Faulkner’s The Sound and Fury Essay -- Faulkn

The Cemetary and Loss in Faulkners The Sound and FuryOn the sixth scallywag of the novel The Sound and The Fury, Caroline Compson informs her son Jason that she and her other son Benjy are going to the cemetery. The sense of loss that runs through much of Faulkners work, especially The Sound and The Fury, evict be found in the quiet, black-and-white world of the dead. In a cemetery one is reminded of lives lost and lost lives. Faulkner honors both in his novel. The story reveals a multilayered cacophony of loss. The trees and the grave stones in the Laurel Grove cemetery have been around for a long time. So has the Compson family. Yet, I get the impression indicant The Sound and The Fury that time is running out for Faulkners fictional dysfunctional family. By the end of the story the...

Case Analysis of Sutton Health

CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 1 Case Analysis of Sutter wellness CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 2 Sutter health is a non-profit network that is made up by community- base health c be providers based in Northern California. This network introduced an interface that was aimed at enhancing tax gathering of the facilities from the self-pay patient.This network set that traditional honorarium transiting arrangement had limitations that hindered the effective collecting of taxation. What with the recession, healthc be organizations have seen an increase in the inability to collect debt from the self-pay, the uninsurable and underinsured patients. This has caused a stilt of struggle when it comes to the organizations to meet the operational margins and the profits.I find there are a number of reasons for the new increase in patients debts, the most common are, poor accounting practices, lack of patient information and correct demographics. There is new cheek that is designed to provide more unified care to said patients (Gleeson,2010). There are five geographic regions that reflects the health care access to the nodes of Northern California. Each of the five regions volition have g everyplacenance structure and it will oversee many of the Sutter affiliated medical facilities and withal the infirmarys. In its effort to increase point of wait on collections and improve the overall revenue roll Sutter health took steps to measure performance using a handful of specific primary benchmarks, empowering PFS supply to assume responsibility for every somebody account they handle, ensure each fitting is analyzed using a rules engine to identify problems before patients leave the registration desk and ensure PFS lag feature appropriate comprehensive fosterage to excel under the new system (Souza, McCarty, 2007).Obtaining the correct patient information plays a large part on non-collectable debt because patients are not able to be reached. These limitatio ns were associated with limited access to precise information by the account representatives, ineffective performance measures and fragmented centers of the service provision. The Sutter Health architectural plan developed a system that was comprised of solutions that were geared towards overcoming these limitations. I will be CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 3 discussing the new system that was created by Sutter Health.The cay problems and issues, is that the United States healthcare system is characterized by huge upkeep from collecting revenue from patients. This situation is brought about by a health care damages system which entails high deductible pay health plans and as well as higher co-payments plan. (Souza, McCarty, 2007). This situation has been made worse through the large symmetry of the population not having healthcare coverage. The traditional health care system has had a severely time meeting their target revenue collection.This is due to several(prenominal) probl ems that attached a presbyopic with the traditional payment system. Unlike when dealing with the payments through insurance claims but also dealing with the up-front payments that are required by the hospital for payment of services before the patient could even receive the service (Souza, Mccarty, 2007). So this means that the patient services faculty (PFS) has to have complete and accurate information about above said client. This presented a problem for the traditional payment system where much of the customer payment system was processed in the back end.This system also required that the PFS staff ask for money from self-pay patients, but the PFS were not accustomed to this under the traditional system. The PFS staff found it hard to wait for the back end section to process customer information and to provide a breakdown of the patients payment details. So this became a tedious line for hospital accounting departments as well as for patients that had to wait a longer period be fore receiving services. The inefficiency of the traditional system not only resulted in low quality services, but also in low revenue collections.The system provides such a broad range of health care services, which allow acute, sub- acute, home health, long term, outpatient care as well as physician deliverance systems. These services are provided through an integrated health care delivery approach that gives the system the ability to deliver a full range of healthcare products and services. CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 4 Sutter also identified that PFS staff could not get ahold of real time information in operational and financial indicators such as cash collections and A/R (Souza, McCarty, 2007).So in the long run this meant that the managers and staff had to wait until the end of the month in order to identify the benchmarks. Sutter also recognized that the traditional system did not provide a means for analyzing selected data nor did it throw required detailed report on d emand. This led to more cost as the hospital had to rely on schedulemers to generate such reports. The front desk staff also lacked real time information which hindered their ability to serve the client without consulting the back end staff.It also meant that the front desk staff could not monitor the patients progress (Souza, McCarty, 2007). Another challenge was that the PFS members were not empowered enough to be held accountable for each patients accounts they dealt with and it slim downd the amount of answerableness among the staff. These are some of the key challenges that the Sutter system were meant to address. The solutions that were employed by Sutter Health was an attempt to overcome the challenges stated above. Sutter Health implemented certain changes in the fore mentioned system that would make their operation more efficient.The strategies identified by the Sutter program entailed transferring most of the back end tasking to the front desk providing accurate and com plete information to managers and upfront staff providing more effective performance evaluation and integrating all data elements within the system (Souza, McCarty, 2007). Allowing front desk staff to handle much of the payment process was deemed to have an effect on the efficiency of the process. Various solutions were employed to ensure that this is achieved.One of these solutions entailed using benchmarks to measure performance by the Patient Service Staff (PFS). Sutter identified a handful of primary benchmarks which included Unbilled A/R days, Gross A/R days, Major A/R days, Cash Collection, Billed A/R days, and CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 5 percentage of A/R over 90, 180, 360 days (Souza, McCarty, 2007). This benchmark introduced shorter periods with which staff performances could be measure outd. This move was seasonable especially when onsidering that the industry has changed and things happen in terms of hours and days but not months. Another solution involved empowerin g the PFS members to have full responsibility over the accounts they are dealing with. This move was meant to increase a sense of responsibility and accountability as each individual members will be responsible for his or her own account (Souza, McCarty, 2007). This also gave the PFS members more self-sufficiency to act as they saw fit and this improved the speed and efficient of service delivery by these staff members.The program also provided the PFS members with tools, that enabled them to automate their accounts, sort out their accounting using various means and seen their performances based on the achievement of the target. PFS and other restrainer representatives were presented with individual dashboards that helped in the tracking of their progress in meeting targets. This also helped in enforcing the benchmarks set by this program. Sutters health program also introduced a front end collecting system as means of overcoming the mentioned problems.The pint of access collectin g system introduced an opportunity for the health care facilities to reduce claims and denials. though this system the patient records are analyzed before the patient leaves the registration desk. This enables the front desk staff to identify problems such as bad debt, patient or invalid patient type early enough and take the necessary corrective action. The Sutter health program also embarked on a comprehensive training program that was designed to support the lively PFS members and the registration staff. This gave staff the necessary competence to deal with the tools provided by this system.The training program also eliminated the need to plight formally educated staff to operate the system that would CASE ANALSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 6 demand more than the $10-$20 an hour paid to current registration and PFS staff. For example, registration staff who were not used to asking patients for money were trained in effective communication skills. The training was also designed to introdu ce self-direction and effectiveness which acted as a motivator to the employee.The Sutter system allows staff to act with more independence which has made them active in owning the system. Autonomy is a little element that enables workers to work effectively and deliver the best when it comes to their ability. The efficiency of the system has also made the work of the staff easier, acting as a kick upstairs motivating factor for the staff. Another solution involved getting patients on board with this program. The POS collection system is not only beneficial to hospitals but also to the health care customers as well. (Souza, McCarty, 2007).This system provides a patient friendly complaints which ensures transparency in the way customers are asked to pay for health care services. The payment system that is in force in other parts, bills the patient after he or she has already received the services and has already left the hospital. However, the Sutter program introduced transparen cy as the patient then gets to realise what the services will cost him or her before they receive the services. It has become evident that patients would love to know how much the care they receive will cost them and this is what the Sutter program has provided.This system also offers a simplified system of settling hospital bills thereby do things easier for customers using said hospital system, customers are usually compelled to produce a lot of records and documentations in order to have their payment processed which introduces a lot of inconveniences. There is more accounting practices that are used by Sutter in identifying and solving problems, such as Sutter was discontented with the amount of revenue being equanimous from the self-pay patients (Souza, McCarty, 2007).The management team understood that the self-pay CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 7 patients were capable of meeting their medical expenses and therefore the problem was in their system. Sutter then resorted to e valuate the accountability and transparency in the process involved in the collection of revenue. It is through this evaluation that most of the traditional system did encourage responsibility and accountability to the people handling the revenue collection. Another accounting practice that was adopted was cost reduction.Accounting principles dictate that there are two major ways for increase the margin increasing profits or reducing costs. After exhausting all the avenues they could use in increasing revenue, Sutter embarked on a campaign that would reduce the cost of operation. This saw the collection process being integrated into a unified system. The methods used were also cost conscious, is why they opted for comprehensive training of their existing PFS and registration staff rather than hiring specially trained professionals, who would have demanded higher pay.Another alternative would be that Sutters strategies focused on improving accountability and autonomy of the staff in order to enhance revenue collection. Sutter health relied on solutions such as setting benchmarks and the empowering of staff. What they found to work was a full calendar method of the amount payable. Amount payable refers to money owed to the institution by other parties while the full cycle refers to the amount of time it takes for the patients to settle their debt. (Rauscher, Wheeler, 2008).Reducing the full cycle may help to reduce the number of bad debts that a health institution suffers from. Traditionally a patient cycle followed procedures such as organizing schedule, registration, treatment, cathexis and collection (Solomon, 2011). The collection part is why the health institution is able to recover the debt owed to it by the patients. This section comes along after the treatment process is cogitate and therefore increases the chances for bad debt. This paper proposes a system where bills are settled on a pre-service basis.The pre-service CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 8 system will be enabled by developing a system that standardized serves to make billing before the client receives services easier (Trans Union, 2007). A per item standardized billing is advised. This is why a standard is set for each and every hospital procedure and the patient is billed by summing up the cost of all service items he or she has utilized. In my informed opinion the approach used by Sutter Health was effective. This is because their approach was able to address the concerns raised by the network.Sutter health was concerned with the growing number of self-pay payments and the diminishing of the amount of revenue. The need to increase the amount of collecting from this section of market was the primary objective of developing this strategy. The triumph of every strategy is able to deliver the set goals. When it comes to Sutter Health it is estimated that revenue collection from the self-pay patients increased by an additional $78 million after the executing of the st rategy (Souza, McCarty, 2007). This is a clear indicator of the programs success. One of the benefits is improved quality of care for the patient.One of the solutions identified by Sutter was bringing the health customer onboard. This system did this by factoring the customers needs into the system, making it customer friendly. The customers now spend less time treat payment while at the same time, the patients get to know of the cost they will incur before receiving the services. The system has also lessen the number of patients being denied treatment as a result of a streamlined inventory system. In conclusion Sutter Health is a non-profit network based in California and is made up of community based health care providers.This case discussed how Sutter developed a system that was able to improve revenue collection from the self-pay patients. Sutter recognized that the number of bad debts was rising along with the rising number of self-pay patients, This network conducted an eval uation on its facilities and identified that the problem of low revenue collection was linked to a disintegrated system of collection, in adequate accurate information CASE ANALYSIS OF SUTTER HEALTH 9 and poor performance indicators.Sutter Health employed solutions that entailed setting new benchmarks, empowering employees, factoring the customers interest and compressive training. References Rauscher, S. & Wheeler, J. (2008). Effective Hospital Revenue Cycle Management. Journal of Healthcare Management Robertson, K. (Oct, 16, 1995). capital of California Business Journal 12, 30 3 Solomon, P. (2011). State of Healthcare Reform Revenue Cycle Retrieved from http//philcsolomon. om/2011/04/the-state-of-healthcare-revenue-cycle-an-insi ders- perspective-part-2/ Souza, M. & McCarty, B. (2007). From bottom to top How one provider retooled collection. Healthcare monetary Management 61 (9). 67-73 Trans Union (2007). Healthcare Collections How Full Cycle Improvements Reduce Bad Debt. http//w ww. tranunion. com/docs/healthcare/businessneeds/healthcarecollectionsWP. pdf

Feminist Theories on Sexuality

Feminist theorists Camille Paglia and Foucault give opposing flocks on the topic of wo custody and their awakenuality as they addressed topics such as homo cozyity and smut as ways of expressing inner desires and the role a woman plays in society in reference to her sexual urge. Camille Paglia, a graduate of the University of Arts in Philadelphia, America, has strong feminist views in relation to wowork forces sexual preferences. Paglia is a bi-sexual female, who came from an Italian, Catholic household with an overprotective and strict family.While watching an interview with Paglia, she stated that through and through her old age growing up, as a girl she was expected to follow certain rules and was (like many girls) led to think in a certain manner for situations such as rape, prostitution and sexual desires. Paglia was opposed to this, as was seen in her countless numbers of affairs which she had with women, despite being married to a man. This shows that Camille Paglia is pro-homosexuality. She allowed herself to explore and believed that the lordliness and freedom of women could not be gained through the overprotective barriers p argonnts and society puts up.By her supporting lesbianism, it in like manner shows her strong views on her personality and disregard for what society thinks of her. another(prenominal) point Paglia brought up was that women are never straight forward when it comes to sexual desires. She made reference to this when she discussed the numerous reports on accused rape. Paglia said that many women are provocative, and send wrong signals to guys. They are the cause of the accused rape, yet they are quick to blame the man who simply acts on the womans actions.Women report cases of rape for simple hand contact, which is mostly due to the womans lead. Women need to express their desires and not see ashamed of it. Paglia says that women want sex as much as man, whether with a female or male, they should be upfront. Camille also d iscussed women in pornography. Many women see pornography as a destroy and disrespectful view towards a woman and her body through these videos, pictures and other forms of porn however Camille believes that a woman should ache the right to portray herself and her sexual desires through any source of media and angle she wants.A woman has full rights to her body and sexual desires and should not be stopped from expressing it. She is against modern feminism because she believes that women lay down a right to these things, and that women need to stop blaming men and become self reliant, independent and relieve that they are differences between men and women that cannot be changed. Women also fork over pornographic minds, and whilst other feminists will be opposed to women expressing themselves and being involved in prostitution and pornography, she disagrees.Throughout an interview with Camille, she made it very clear that she was pro-pornography, as she menti hotshotd this numero us times to emphasized that women need to be strong on their desires and not be judged on their preferences. (female-female male-female male-male). This proves her point that women must be able to accept who they are and hit the ability to show it, and not be restricted because of gender barriers and expectations of society. The role of women and their sexual preferences and desires are based on the current situations in society.This point is shown through the theories by Foucault. Through history, culture determined how sexuality was originated. Foucault believed that as time progresses, the idea of lesbianism and bi-sexual relations are growing. These desires are only give birth because of the new cultures and society that is present now. For example, in the 1800s, women were not allowed to choose their own mates or express their sexuality, and this is still present even now in the 21st century in some areas. The change in this tradition only occurred through time and what was s een as the new norm and custom in the society.The episteme of society determined the sexual desires and preferences in a particular era and the way they think. (Episteme is the way a specific culture move upes the world). Foucault believes that as society transitions, their thoughts and views also change due to the ideology itself shifting. Another point Foucault made was related to sex and womens role in sex. Sex is seen as a social construct that is constructed through the exercise of power relations. Sexual nature is produced through society.Foucault stated that before, in previous generations, there was never a big pore on sex, whereas now, the desire for sex is increasing and will continue to increase in years to come. The world is culturally constituted and the body is seen materially through the eyes of man. Men use women for sex, and whilst women may think they are equal, men view them as sex objects. Feminists, as mentioned previously, deny having sexual tendencies and s exual preferences, and unconnected Camille Paglia, who believes this is false, Foucault agrees with this statement.He relates this statement to his theory that sexual tendencies and desires are based on societys ideology, rather than natural desires. Like Paglia, Foucault mentioned the role of women through pornography as well. However his views differed from Camilles as he believes that pornography is an invention by man used to de-humanize women and socially constructs her oppression. He does not believe that women have a desire to produce porn, but instead they are manipulated into thinking that is what they want and they only please men, rather than expressing themselves and pleasing their own self.Foucaults approach to a womans sexuality is based on the views of society and the manipulation in from each one era, mostly endorsed by man upon women. Camille Paglia believes that men and women have natural qualities and that they should not base their choices on what men demand of them, but on what their desire is whereas Foucault believes a womans sexuality is determined on society and the manipulation of men on women in reference to sex and sexual activities and preferences. I agree with Camille Paglias theory that women are different from men and must become their own individual, independent and free from reliance on man.A woman must take charge of her body and her sexual desires and not be expected to pretend that they are not naturally inclined towards sex. Camille expresses a pro-pornography mind and I agree that a woman should not be degraded for expressing her desires through pictures, videos or sex itself. Women should be allowed to freely express themselves without being restricted and judged by society and men. Also, as Camille Paglia stated, men should not be blamed for everything, and women should stand up for themselves and show everyone what they want.Camille is also pro-prostitution. A woman has full rights to her body and only a woman can de termine what she wants to do with her body. A woman has the right to participate in any sexual act she desires, because it is only her decision. Women are categorized, according to Paglia, as having more emotional and sexual desires than men, but are not able to show it. Paglias point of this categorization is to show that women do not express their sexual desires freely because they are not allowed to show it.Whether it is true or not, I agree that a woman should have the freedom of being able to share their wants and needs without having to feel ashamed or self-conscious. Paglia says that the only way for this to happen, is if women begin to stop waiting, and start acting on becoming independent and taking personal responsibility, without blaming other mountain for your problems or your limitations. Feminist theories on sexuality show the rights of a woman in their ability to express and have sexual desires and preferences, and how they portray these elements.On one hand, Camille Paglia argues that women should take the initiative to become independent and not rely on man, and be free to express their natural sexual desires. On the other hand, Foucault believes that men control women, and a womans sexuality is determined on the stage of society and the transitions in the ideology of the culture and society. The both theorists contrast each other in theories in their views on a womans sex life. The belief that men construct society is supported by Foucault and opposed by Paglia.Homosexuality is supported by both theorists in different ways. Foucault believes it is due to the transitions in society, where as Paglia believes that it is due to natural inclinations. Their different approaches to womens sexuality were well analyzed and represent the two different views from feminists. Feminist theories on sexuality vary according to the theorist, and each person has a different view on whether a woman has a right to express her sexuality or whether certain acts a re frowned upon when done by a woman because of a womans expectations and stereotype.

Forgetting About Something Essay

Have you ever experienced forgetting about something? Like where did you perplex your pair of socks, where did you leave your car keys, or where did you put your playpen? Did you ever wonder wherefore or how this happens? For a period of three (3) days, I tried to observe myself. I used to forget where I put my door key. I realized that I have forgotten where my key in three different situations When I need to get out of the means When something reminded me about keys like doors and door knobs, and When I saw the usual spot for my room key and the key is not there. As I have researched, forgetting, similarly called as cue-dependent forgetting, is the failure to recall a memory due to missing stimuli or cues that were present at the time the memory is encoded. There are factors why retrieval of the memory fails. Usually, the information no longer exist in the mind that why a material cannot be found or cannot be recalled. Emotions also play a crucial role. The reason why I forg et where I leave my key is that I am always in a hurry.And as I have observed, there are also reasons why I manage to bring forward where my key is. First, whenever I forgot where my key is, I am in a hurry to get out of the room and I cannot think properly where I last put my key. Then, I remember to recall where I put my key because I saw an object that reminds me of my key such as doors and knobs. Lastly, when I manage to relax for a piece and see if I have got everything in order, I tend to look at the spot where I place my key.Being an important object or simply because it is a personal belonging, I have a list on my mind where my important things are. Concluding the activity, when someone is in hurry or feeling excited, the tendency to forget is very possible because there is so much going on with our minds. But once we take time to relax, recall, or back track our activities earlier, we can avoid retrieval failure on our memories. Reference Baddeley, A. D. (1997). Human Mem ory Theory and Practice. Taylor and Francis Group.

Let’s Go to the Beach Essay

It was summer, last year in July 15th the hotter sidereal day of the sea give-and-take do me took to my young intelligence, my niece, and my mummyma to the shore. It was noon, when I sight that my mom to come from Mexico who was visiting me for some months was getting bore at home. Because she loves to be in Mexico, when she visited me I have to do fun thinks to extend her full point with me. Thinking what should I do to make her happy I had a great idea come to me and I told them lets go to the beach. Without hesitation my mom verbalise yes. I asked my ten years old son and my fourteen years old niece if they could help me to hold her because my moms troubles to walk alone.With a very blue sky, hot and yellow sun and the kids support with my mom I thought that it would be a blameless day to final payment my mom to the beach. My mom and I would not expect that going to the beach at a beautiful day, in a blink we will be terrified and involved others to spoil their beautifu l day too. Planning to have a perfect day at seascape Beach Resort, I learn that by my mistake inadvertence the b seter day, would become in a nightmare turning our day in a apparition day. After to invite my family to the beach, quickly I had to package some staff that we subscribe to spend all day at the beach.I gave to my niece some fitly cloths to go to the beach, my son wore his sandals, short and a light t shirt. Faster, I dressed a short and sandals too but my mom who though that she wint get wet to the beach, she did not want to change her beautiful light green pants and her write blouse that she was wearing. After we changed our clothes, I got four towels, my sunglasses, and a cap. As my purpose was to stay six hours at the beach, I made some sandwiches, water bottlers I cut a sweet watermelon, a cantaloupe, and bananas.Having it, I tough it is all that we need to get fun at the beach. Exited to be at the beach, my mom and the kids were into my car happily where my mom was in the font, my niece and my son on the substantiate sets. Taking the 101 north highway, I drove to the road of the Seascape Beach Resort. While I was driving, we were listening Spanish music to made my mom felt much more relax. Even though the day was hot we were happy because I turned the air condition in and there was not traffic and we laughed, joked each other, and we talked about the beautiful day that we would expected to have.After twenty minutes driving, we arrived to the parking lot As I worked at Seascape Beach Resort for seven years, I knew where I should park my car safety for a long time and how to get to the beach opus we can enjoy the scene of the path. Getting out towels and food, I was essay to leave my cell phone in my car, when my mom saw it she told me bring it Ill take care of it, I wont be wet in the beach. Easily, she convinced me and she put my cell in her pans packet. Because the hotter day, anxiously my niece and my son valued to get wet and play with the sand, so they walk faster.Feeling my niece and my son the smell of the beach, they could not wait to touch the cold water. Recently my mom got a total stifle replay surgery she was futile to walk faster as my niece and my son. Taking the path of the beach, they let my mom and me behind. Frequently, I used to take my son at this beach, so they knew the path very well that tis why I allowed them to walk quickly. Whishing this beautiful day for my mom were unforgettable we walked slowly prop my moms raft, enjoying the view through the beachs path.Feeling the freshener of the green threes, getting relax with a beautiful fountains, looking at the eyeshade gardens, and when we were close to the beach we enjoy the smell of the beach. After a few minutes with an enjoyable rode of the beach, we finally were at the beach. Before this day I took my mom to the same beach to watch the waves sitting on the beachs bench and got refresh because her weakness of her knee. I wanted my mom has a perfect day, pampering her, I said yes for that entire she wanted without though that a nightmare will happen to us.Feeling my mom attracted to the waves and the beachs archness and the smell of the breeze she asked me if she could get wet her feet. Why not, I said her. Caring my mom shoes in my left hand and my right hand holding her, slowly, we started to walk. Felling the burner sand in our feet, we continued to walk into the wet sand. With a very beautiful blue sky, and fresh waves, my mom feet happy and relax. After, we met with my son and my niece, who were playing with the sand and getting wet with the waves I told them my mom wants her feet get wet, we will be walking right there to the beach.With Disregard they said yes because they were very busy with the waves. A few minutes ago, unsounded walking under the wet sand, my mom wanted her feet touch the cooler water. Feeling the frigidity of the breeze, touching our face and smelling the fragrance of the beach, m y mom feet got wet. Two minutes later, walking still slowly under the sand a very down in the mouth wave was coming to us. Happily, my mom and I, we were waiting the wave. Suddenly, I saw a very big wave coming to us. Immediately, I told my mom lets go back quickly a big wave is coming towards us.Even though I want to walk faster, my mom was unable to do because my moms knee weakness. Then, the big wave reached us soon. Holding my moms hand she, felt down lay at the water. Because my back injured I was incapable to stand up her. Terrify, for a few seconds, and unable to help my mom, I saw some people farther of us. Frighten, and desperate because my mom was in danger to be driven for more big waves that were coming to us, I was holding tightly my moms hand with my other hand I made some signal wishing the Americans family help. Fortunately, they saw my hands signal, so they guest that we need help.Two minutes later, they were coming one by one to help us. First it was just a lady who was trying to stand up by pulling my mom, while I tried to push her, but we could not stand up her. Soon, they were four more people who arrived to get her up. Thankfully to the openhearted family help, by my negligence to allow my niece and my son to separate of my mom instead of held them to be close to my mom while she waked I spoiled the beautiful day to this family also. My mom, totally wet and dirty her light green pants and white blouse when her shoes were driven by the waves too, finally, we got my mom up.Immediately, the kindly family called to Seascape beach carriage guard to be sure that my mom was not injured. Because she was shaking for the tragedy and the cold water friendly, they sat her down in one of their chair that they had, trying to calm down, cleaning and drying, her with their big new towels that they had. Pampering my mom and waiting for the safe guard they frequently, need me, to asked her if she was fine because my mom cannot speak any English word. After twenty minutes of my moms tragedy I remembered that my son and my niece also were there.Still trembling I told the family members that there were two kids with us. Then, my son and my niece were called by one lady of this family witch let they know about my mom tragedy. Generously, around half an hour, my mom was pampering by this family while we were still waiting for the life guard, such us surrounding her, warming, hugging, and trying to make her safe outside the water. A few minutes later, the life guard came to us, when in detail, the family explained to the guy all about my moms accident and telling the guy about my moms recently knee surgery.Immediately, her blood pressure, her knee surgery, and everything of my mom were examined by the safe guard. Patiently, they helped her to ride the big truck when she was transported the outside of the beach. They also arranged with the bell men to give us a go to my car because my moms shoes were missing, even though the bell boy was known to me because we were co-workers. Helplessness, how as humans bad things can happened and we cannot help ourselves, so we just ask others for help.Luckily, the generosity of this family save my mom to be browned at the beach, this nightmare taught me that they are some places when should I not take my mom by myself. Even though I have been giving the best care at my home for a long time, with my moms back, hip, and knee problems and her seven and eight years old and my back problem it was my big mistake to took her to the beach alone. With our short stance and bad experience at the beach, we back inside my car quite grateful with the American family who save my mom life.

Safety On Board Ships Engineering Essay

Safety is of extreme importance onboard ships. in that respect have been mevery an(prenominal) ship related accidents and incidents that have claimed legion(predicate) lives. One such common accident would be fire eruptions onboard ships. Due to the high figure of such fatal happenings, MARPOL and SOLAS have been erected, and they contain regulations and ordinances that all mariners must stay by. In order to forestall incidents, safety equipments are commonly installed in the ships. One of such safety equipments would be demodulators.Detectors are devices that can expose fire or some other risky conditions. Onboard ships, in that respect are several different shells of perception elements.They are as follows incinerate DetectorFlamm fit shoot a lineconade Detector refrigerating Gas Leak DetectorWater Level detector1. Fire DetectorFire sensing elements are spendd to reveal fires onboard ships. Fire is a common jeopardy that happens at sea. Statistically, fire eruption s have resulted in more entire losingss of ships than any other signifier of casualty. Most of the fires are caused by carelessness and sloppiness. Fortunately, with fire sensors, the extent of harm caused by fires can be mostly minimised. A good fire sensor is one that is dependable and requires marginal attending. More significantly, the fire sensor must non be set despatch by normal happenings in the protected infinite, hence its sensitiveness must be adjusted accurately and in conformity to its surrounding.Under fire sensors, there are 3 sub emblemsSmoke sensorFlame sensor wake sensora ) Smoke sensor The deuce types of dope sensors Ionisation sensor and photoelectricalal sensor. The ionization sensor reacts to both the microscopic and unseeable merchandises of burning, moreover the photoelectric type merely responds to seeable merchandises of burning.Ionisation smoke sensors make usage of ionization sleeping room and a generator of ionization radiation to find pot. i n that respect are two types of ionization bullet sensors. One type uses a bipolar ionised nerve-racking chamber, and the other uses a unipolar ionise trying chamber. The beginning of ionization radiation comes from a little sum of americium-241, which is a good beginning of alpha atoms.The bipolar ionised trying chamber type fume sensor has an ionization chamber that contains two electrodes of a likely difference as a electromotive force is applied across them. In between the two electrode is air-filled infinite. The alpha particles that are being produced by the americium-241 ionises the air in between the two electrodes. To ionize agencies to strike hard off an negatron from an atom. This creates a free negatron and a positively-charged ion. The free election will so be attracted to the positively-charge electrode and the positive ion will be attracted to the negatively-charged electrode, due to the possible difference between the two electrodes. This, hence, produces a chang eless flow of incumbent between the electrodes. When a minute measure of fume enters the air-filled infinite in between the electrodes, the ionized air atoms get neutralised by the fume atoms. This will ensue in a autumn of current between the electrodes. The fume sensor detects this bead in current and sets off the fire dis may.The 2nd type of ionization fume sensor has a unipolar ionized trying chamber alternatively of a bipolar 1. The lone difference is that for the bipolar one, the whole chamber is exposed to the radiation, whereas for the unipolar 1, merely the immediate country neighboring(a) to the positive electrode is exposed to the alpha beginning. As a consequence, the unipolar type has merely one prevailing type of ions, which are anions, in the electrical current flow between the electrodes. Presently, the unipolar type fume sensors are the commercially most common 1s.One of the few drawbacks of ionization type fume sensors is that there may be frequent false dismaies. The ground being that any micron-size atom, such as kitchen lubricating oil atoms, come ining the ionization chamber can very put off the dismay. However, this type of fume sensors are still the most normally used, due to their dependability, low cost and comparatively maintenance-free operation.Smoke DetectorThere are two headman types of photoelectric fume sensors, viz. the projected beam type and the reflected beam type. Photoelectric smoke sensors work on earth of the presence or absence of visible radiation.The projected beam type consists of a photoelectric detector with light falling on it from a beginning located at holds or other protected infinite on the ship. When there is the presence of fume, the light strength of the beam that is received in the photoelectric cell lessenings due to it being obscured by the fume atoms. This decreased mark of light strength causes the electrical circuit to the photoelectric cell to be imbalanced, and and so triping the dismay.The r eflected light beam type fume sensor consists of a light beginning, a light backstop positioned face-to-face to the light beginning and in addition a photoelectric cell fixed normal to the light beginning. When fume particles enter into the light beam part, some visible radiation is being reflected onto the photoelectric cell. This creates a closed circuit, and thereof puting off the dismay.Photoelectric sensors are normally used to protect storage countries and high value compartments, and besides to supply fume sense for air canals and plenum countries.However, the downside of this type of photoelectric fume sensor is that the fume has to be thick before it can be detected. This is due to its comparatively low sensitiveness. The convinced(p) side of this type of fume sensors is that there will be fewer false dismaies.Smoke sensors are chiefly used in machinery infinites, lading holds and valuation reserve countries. All ships built since September 1985 are required to be prov ided with smoke sensors in corridors and over staircases within adjustment infinites. Both the ionization and photoelectric fume sensors are effectual as they provide sufficient clip for people to get away in the caseful of a fire eruption. Each type of fume sensor, though different in working rules, has its ain advantages. For illustration, ionization fume sensors have a response quicker for flaring fires. As for photoelectric sensors, they respond more rapidly to smoldering fires. To guarantee the high degree of protection, it is advised to utilize both types of sensors. There are combination dismaies, that contains both type of engineerings in one device, and it besides can be employed to accomplish higher protection.B ) Flame sensor Fires are normally caused by catalyst and liquid fires. Flame sensor uses optical detectors to observe fires. Fires set apart off radiation dwelling chiefly of ultra-violet radiation, seeable visible radiation and infrared radiation. There are ab out 6 types of fire sensors, which consist of UV ( UV ) , infrared ( IR ) , UV/IR, IR/IR, IR/IR/IR and seeable detectors.Ultraviolet sensors are able to observe fires and detonations in approximately 4 msecs. When a little fire is ignited, an ultraviolet sensor can instantly weaken the type of fire it is. Even though they are really accurate, ultraviolet sensors can be fooled by radiation, discharge welding, sunshine and lightning.An infrared fire sensor plants by utilizing an infrared set. When hot gas pedales are released dear(p) an infrared sensor, The little thermic imaging camera within the sensor will so houseclean up on the presence of these gases. However, false dismaies can be set off when other wanted beginnings of hot gas are present near an infrared fire.UV/IR sensor plants by utilizing a combination of UV and IR engineering to observe a fire. Such a sensor gathers information from the UV and infrared position. With these two engineerings working together, false dism aies can be minimised. The similar rule applies to IR/IR fire sensor. It detects flames within two infrared frequences. Hence, IR/IR sensors are besides able to extinguish most false dismaies.The IR/IR/IR sensors are the most accurate. They use three different infrared frequences used to observe a fire. IR/IR/IR sensors work by comparing three wavelength sets, therefore, it is extremely unconvincing for this type of a fire sensor to give off a false dismay. Often, in order to observe seeable fires, seeable detectors are besides installed in with the fire sensor.Hence, when a fire occurs, flame sensors are able to observe the radiations, and will so put off the dismay. Fire sensors are normally used near to fuel managing equipment in the machinery infinites and besides at boiler foreparts.Flame sensor type partsInfrared Flame Detectordegree Celsius ) Heat sensor It is a device that responds when the thermic energy of a fire increases the temperature of a shake up sensitive compone nt. Heat sensors have two chief categorizations Fixed temperature and Rate-of- source.Fixed temperature heat sensors operates when the heat sensitive component in it r all(prenominal)es a certain fixed temperature. Thermal slowdown delays the accretion of heat at the heat sensitive component so that the device will merely make the operating temperature sometime after the encompassing temperature exceeds that temperature. When the fixed operating temperature of the heat sensitive component is reached, the dismay connected to the heat sensor will be set off.Rate-of-rise heat sensors activates when there is a rapid rise in temperature of the heat sensitive component, normally about 6.7a?C to 8.3a?C addition per minute. This type of heat sensors work irrespective of the starting temperature. This would intend that the rate-of-rise heat sensor may put off the dismay before the fixed operating temperature is reached.Presently, most heat sensors use the bimetallistic strip mechanism. The b imetallistic strip is do up of two strips of metal stuck together, and each have different rate of enlargement. When there is a rise in temperature, one strip will crack out more than the other. This causes the bimetallistic strip to curve. The coil will ensue in the strip touching a contact that will shut the circuit, and therefore bring forth a current flow, which will so put off the dismay.The newest type of heat sensor is called the rate-compensated sensor. It is sensitive to both the rate of rise of temperature, and besides a fixed temperature degree, both of which are illustrated above. Heat sensors are rarely used because of the trouble in proper arrangement comparative moving in environment and jeopardy countries.Heat sensors are chiefly used in topographical points such as the galleys and the wash where other types of fire sensors will give off false dismaies.Heat DetectorFire sensors are placed all over any marine vas. However, different types of fire sensors are con form to at different locations. In the work store country, welding plants invariably produces fume and bare fires. Hence, a heat sensor would be most suited or none should be placed in this country as it is a certified hot work country. In the engine control room, fume sensors are used. At parts near boilers and incinerators, a bare fire can be produced due to unnatural conditions. Hence, the most suited types of fire sensors would be the ionisation type fume sensor and infrared fire sensor. Smoke sensors are by and large used throughout the engine room. The fire sensors are used near fuel managing wholes like refiners, purifiers, conditioners and hot filters.2. Flammable Gas DetectorFlammable gases are gases that at ambient temperature and force per unit area, forms a flammable mixture with air at a concentration of 13 per centum by volume or less. Some illustrations of flammable gases that are normally ground in ships are hydrocarbon gases, H sulfide and O.Flammable gas sensors will pull samples of air sporadically, and analyze them for chiefly hydrocarbon gas and besides other flammable gases. If the gas concentration is above the pre-set dismay threshold, an dismay will sound off instantly.Flammable gas sensors, though non compulsory, are normally installed in enwrap infinites which can keep high volumes of flammable gases. The danger of lading leaks into null infinites and ballast armored combat vehicles, and the hazard of detonations associated with a physique up of hydrocarbon gas is something to be taken earnestly.Flammable gas sensors are sometimes besides installed at adjustment air conditioning recess. This is to forestall fire eruptions to go on in countries where there are changeless human activity.Harmonizing to SOLAS Chapter II, 2 statute 5.10.1, Protection of lading pump-rooms . It is a mandatory ordinance that is applicable all types of oilers that show ladings with a flash point of below 60AC in relation to cargo pump room safety. In o rder to observe leaks, the ordinances states that hydrocarbon gas spotting are to be installed within the pump room, with dismay being pre-set at no more than 10 % Lower Explosive Limit ( LEL ) . LEL of a evaporation or a gas is the restricting concentration ( in air ) that is required for the gas to light and detonate.3. Refrigerant Gas Leak DetectorRefrigerant gases are chemical merchandises used in deep-freezes, iceboxs, air conditioning units. These gases have low vaporization points, hence they will distill under force per unit area to chill the air. The perennial procedure of vaporizing and distilling the gases pulls heat out of the air, therefore cut downing the temperature of the in the unit. There are many different types of refrigerating gas, and the more common 1s include CFC ( CFC ) , HCFC ( HCFC ) , HFC ( HFC ) , perfluorocarbon ( PFC ) , and blends made from ammonium hydroxide and C dioxide.However, instances of escape of refrigerating gases is a common sight. Some refrigerating gases are damaging to our environment. For illustration, when CFC is released into the ambiance, a chemical alteration will take topographic point due to its exposure to the UV visible radiation. This reaction will ensue in the production of green house gases, and besides depletes the ozone bed. Bing able to observe refrigerant gas escape can assist cut down on unneeded disbursals and besides assist protect the environment.Harmonizing to MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 12 ozone depletion substances, refrigerant gas sensors are to be installed to supervise and observe any escapes of refrigerating gases. Refrigerant gases are continually monitored by fixed gas detectors. When the sensor detects that the refrigerant gas concentration exceeds a certain prefixed bound ( e.g. 25 ppm for ammonium hydroxide, 300 ppm for halogenated fluorocarbons ) , the dismay will be set off, appall whoever manning the system.Refrigerant gas sensors are normally located in topographic points whe re the refrigerant are likely to leak, such as the centralized lading infrigidation systems, centralised air conditioning systems and centralised domestic infrigidation systems.4. Water Level DetectorWater escape and immersion may go on onboard ships. When lading holds or bulkhead are filled with extra H2O, it will damage the lading onboard and besides badly affect the perkiness and stableness of the ship. Worst instance scenario would be the implosion therapy of the ship, taking to it droping. Hence, H2O sensors are of high importance, and are used to observe if the H2O degree, in any compartment, exceeds over a preset tallness.Harmonizing to SOLAS dozen Regulation 12 and SOLAS Regulation II-1/23-3, majority bearers and general lading vass are required to be installed with H2O degree sensors. Water degree sensors means a system consisting detectors and indicant devices that detect and warn of H2O immersion in lading holds and other infinites as required. The method of observing t he H2O degree may be by direct or indirect agencies. Direct agencies of sensing determine the presence of H2O by physical contact of the H2O with the sensing device. Indirect means include devices without physical contact with H2O.Water sensors are positioned at a preset tallness at the aft terminal of each person lading clasp or compartment. The height place specifications are different between majority bearers and lading vass. When the H2O degree in any peculiar compartment reaches the dismay degree, the sensor will observe it, and the dismay will be set off. The image below is an illustration of the place of the H2O sensor detectors.hypertext transfer protocol //www.km.kongsberg.com/KS/WEB/NOKBG0397.nsf/AllWeb/51C66AA6A4CD0F2BC1256EA7004D1E89/ $ file/c200wid_ae.pdf? OpenElementDecisionFor the safety of lives out at sea, and the protection of our environment, different types of sensors have been invented and installed onboard ships. The chief sensors that can be undercoat in any ships are those explained above, which are the fire sensor, flammable gas sensor, refrigerant gas sensor and the H2O degree sensor. There are many other different types of sensors that uses different types of mechanisms, but still function same intent as those stated supra. Equally long as the sensors are able to function their map and are besides in conformity with MARPOL and SOLAS ordinances, they will be permitted excessively.

Legal Memorandum of the case of Griswold v. Connecticut

The appellants in this case are Griswold, the Executive Director of the mean Parenthood League of computed axial tomography, and Buxton, the Medical Director of the Planned Parenthood League in New Haven. They were charged of violating a Connecticut statute for giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married couple as means of preventing conception. secant 53-32 of the Connecticut Statute states that Any psyche who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall(a) be fined not less than liter dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned. Section 54-196 provides that Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands an opposite to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.The appellants were found guilty as accessories for violating the verbalise statute and fined $100 each. They filed their appeal an d argued that the said statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. dealWhether the Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the aright of secretiveness which is protected by the beat of RightsDecisionThe Supreme Court figured that the subject Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptive violates the right to marital privacy. It is unconstitutional.AnalysisThis is not the first time the Connecticut statute has been the subject of a controversy. In the earlier case of Tileston v. Ullman 318 U.S. 44 (1943) the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to rule the constitutionality of the said statute. In this case, a doctor challenged the statute on the grounds that a ban on contraception may in certain situations threaten the lives and well-being of her patients.He argued that the statute would prevent his giving superior advice concerning the use of contraceptive s to three patients whose condition of health was such that their lives may be endangered by child-bearing. The Supreme Court declined to rule on this issue and dismissed the case on the ground that the plaintiff lacked the standing to litigate the constitutional questionThis is the first time that the Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of the statute. According to the Supreme Court, though the US Constitution and the Bill of rights does not explicitly mention some rights, such as right of the pile to meet and associate, or the right of the parent to educate a child in a school of their pickaxe, or the right to study any feature subject or foreign language, the First Amendment has been construed to provide protection to these rights.Among these cases are the Pierce v. Society of Sisters which affirmed the right of the parents to send their children to any school of their choice nether the First and Fourteenth Amendment the Meyer v. Nebraska case which affirmed the right of the students to study German language in a private school the NAACP v. aluminum which protected the freedom to associate and affirmed a persons privacy in ones own association.These cases strongly indicate that the Bill of Rights have penumbras which emanate from the specific provisions of the US Constitution and its amendments. These extended guarantees give flesh and blood to the various protections under the US Constitution without which the guarantees under it will merely be a useless formality. Indeed, the various guarantees create zones of privacy.The relationship between spouses and their choice to procreate lie within the zone of privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute should therefore be struck down as unconstitutional. It is a well-settled principle that though the state may stop or prevent activities that are subject to its regulation, it cannot exercise its power so broadly as to invade the areas protected by the constitution.The objective o f the statute is commendable but means for its accomplishment seriously violates the right to privacy of the married individuals. The objective of the statute could be accomplished by other means such as regulating of the manufacture, sale of the contraceptives.If the Supreme Court were to uphold the constitutionality of this statute, it is as if we are tolerating the law enforcement officers to search the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms simply for the purpose of determination out if they are indeed using contraceptives..ConclusionThe Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and the appellate court. It also invalidated a Connecticut statute for invading the privacy of married couples. Although the constitution does not explicitly mention the right to privacy of the citizens, this right is found in the penumbras of the other constitutional protections.This case is considered as a land retire decision in the sense that it established a basic sphere of personal privacy to which all people are entitled. (Decision Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)) It confirmed that marriage couples do have the right to privacy. With this decision, our country took a giant leap forward finally recognizing the right of individuals to make their most private decision on planning their families, deciding the number and spacing of children. (Elizabeth Borg, 2005) Further, this decision paved the way for another land mark decision which is the case of Roe v. Wade. (John W. Johnson, 2005)BibliographiesBorg, Elizabeth. (2005) The Fight that Won Us the Right to Birth Control. Star Tribune. 8June 2005. Retrieved 11 September 2007Decision Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) About.com. Retrieved 11 September 2007 from http//atheism.about.com/library/decisions/privacy/bldec_GriswoldConn.htmJohnson, John W. (2005) Birth Control and the Constitutional Right to Privacy. Retrieved 11September 2007 from http//www.kansaspress.ku.edu/johgri.htmlTileston v. Ullman 318 U.S. 44 (1943)

Characters in Othello: Colors and Shapes

The colorize and cast of characters I chose for Othello are silver and the absent-minded shape. I thought about it for a while and this indifferent shape fits othello perfectly for many reasons. Like Othello this is the outsider of the group since it has no real shape. The shapes physical appearance is different from the rest, just like Othello is since hes a moor and has a different skin tone.Towards the end of the third act Othello starts to lose his stern confidence front and his real insecurities come out. He shows that he feels not confined and proper enough for the whites. Also his age is another big insecurity that he feels when Desdemonas faithfulness is in question. This relates to the indifferent shape of the group trying to front like its a shape when really its not. Silver best describes Othello with the following voiceistics honorable, chivalrous,and romantic. These are displayed when Othello woos desdemona with his story and by his high ranking in the venetian army .I chose lavender, pink, and a dance orchestra to represent Desdemonas character. Desdemona represents perfection in the story with her looks and appearance. This is why the circle with no rough edges and a perfectly drawn out figure fits Desdemona perfectly. Desdemona is completely the opposite of Othello she comes from a prominent and perfect family. While Othello has braggart(a) up with no silver spoon, (even thou ironically thats his color), he was raised into slavery and the army. These trials and tragedies Othello overcame shaped him into the shape he is. Also like the inside of the circle Desdemonas character lacks depth and seems somewhat empty. Some character traits Desdemona does display are affection for Othello when his life story moves her to the point of tears. She shows compassion by verbalize she will do whatever her yellowish brown asks of her and simply cannot say no to him. She also comes off as a romantic when she disobeys her father to be with her lover and runs off.The shapes and colors that best go with Cassio are yellow and a triangle. Cassio is a triangle in my opinion because he has a high stature which bureau everything to him. Like the stature of an equilateral triangle in math and if the triangle loses one angle it messes up the unharmed triangle. This is sort of like how Cassio messed up erst in Othellos eyes and lost everything. Yellow best fits Cassioss character which is happy go lucky flirt. He was optimistic throughout the whole story and was very people orientated, maybe even too much. this was his biggest character flaw and his downfall thanks to Iagos evil scheming.Iago is the roughly evil character in the play hands down, but he might also be the smartest. I chose dark blue, black, and a square to represent him. Black is the color that represents evil which Iago is for turing everyone against each other and making evil conniving plans behind there back. Just because hes evil doesnt mean hes not smart. Iago is very intelligent he single handedly played everyone. Like a square Iago seems things from every angle (front back and side to side) and has encompassing vision. So dark blue which means intelligent, responsible, and self reliant seemingly fits him.If I had to pick colors and a shape to represent me I would tell apart the same shape as Othello, beige and mint green. Although I didnt choose the same shape as Othello for the same reasons. My reasoning behind my choice for that shape are I dont really ever plan much out, I bend and just go with the flow. Also this shape is different from the rest and thats how I see myself, different from the rest. My colors represent me an the way I am which is more quiet and laid back than most people. These colors also fit my personality. Which I consider kind hearted and quiet even though I cant always make everyone happy I always try.

Competition Between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects

t Ameri toilette stinting tie beam Competition between Private and unre unmitigateded Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects Author(s) Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano Source The Ameri give the axe Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar. , 1998), pp. 33-62 Published by American Economic Association Stable URL http//www. jstor. org/stable/116817 . Accessed 01/02/2011 1255 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs equipment casualty and Conditions of Use, available at . http//www. jstor. org/page/info/ab out(a)/policies/terms. jsp.JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in divide, that un slight you learn assure outed former permission, you whitethorn non d sufferload an total issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive notwithstanding for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding both(prenominal) throw out use of this work. Publisher contact information m ay be obtained at . http//www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=aea. . Each feign of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the analogous copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for- salary service that helps scholars, researchers, and scholarly persons discover, use, and build upon a wide telescope of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and as well asls to ontogenesis productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For much than information about JSTOR, please contact emailprotected org. American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Economic Review. http//www. jstor. org CompetitionBetween Privateand Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-GroupEffectsBy DENNIS EPPLE AND RICHARD E. ROMA no A theoretical and computational mystify with tax-financed, study-free universe takes and matched, tuiti on-financed cloistered prep bes is bettered. Students differ by skill and income. Achievement depends on sustain talent and on mates abilities. proportion has a strict hierarchy of crop qualities and twodimensional assimilator sorting with stratification by top executive and income. In snobby checks, high- cap efficiency, low-income assimilators receive tuition discounts, while lowability, high-income disciples pay tuition premia. culture verifiers outgrowth the relative size of the occult firmament and the extent of student sorting, and benefit high-ability students relative to low-ability students. (JEL H42, 128) Discontent in the United States with the primary and trisolelyary nurtureal system has become the norm. The go down in SAT scores in the 1970s, embarrassinginternationalcomparisons of student achievement, dumb growth in productivity measures, and remove magnitude disparity in earnings tot on the wholey c just into doubt the prime(a) of the p edagogyal system. Education polity figured prominently in recenit presidential elections.The debate has c inject on issues of instruct select, including voucher systems (K atomic government issue 18n De Witt, 1992). Typical voucher proposals provide students come acrossing underground prepares a tax-financed, school-redeemable voucher of firm hail toward (or possibly covering) tuition. Although a 1993 California referendumfor vouchers was defeated, policy form at state and local anesthetic trains abounds, as does change in the personal educational arena. The state of Minnesota and school districts in 30 states each(prenominal)ow residents to subscribe to the public school their children attend. 2The city of Milwaukee introduced a voucher system in the 1989-1990 school year.A - do f secret o school and mysterious-public school initiatives atomic number 18 developing (see e. g. , John F. Witte et al. , 1993 Steve Forbes, 1994 Steven Glazerman and RobertH. Meyer, 19 94 Joe Nathan, 1994 Newsweek, 1994 Wall road Journal, 1994 Steven Baker, 1995 Jay P. Green et al. , 1996). Educational reform emphasizing change magnitude school competition with an increased * Epple GraduateSchool of IndustrialAdministration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Romano segment of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.We greatly appreciate the comments of Linda Argote, Richard Arnott, Lawrence Kenny, Tracy Lewis, David Sappington, Suzanne Scotchmer, and three anonymous referees, in rise to power to workshop participants at Carnegie Mellon University, Florida State University, atomic number 49 University, Northwestern University, Princeton University, the University of Chicago, the University of Colorado, the University of Florida, the University of Illinois, the University of Kansas, the University of Virginia, Yale University, the 1993 Public Choice meetings, and the 1994 American Economic Association meetings.We thank the Nationa l Science Foundation, and Romano thank the Public Policy Research Center at the University of Florida for pecuniary support. Epple acknowledges the supportof Northwestern University, where proficiently of this research was conducted. Anv errors argon ours. 2 Public funding of nonsecular schools and rateable freedom of school choice has been practicedfor years in England (Daphne Johnson, 1990) and overmuch of Canada (Nick Kach and Kas Mazurek, 1986). These choice systems support horizontal differentiation in schooling and safeguards exist to limit vertical ( flavour) differentiation.Our compendium is concerned primarily with the substances of a voucher system on vertical differentiation. The provocatively name report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983), A Nation at Risk, details the dec crease of performance of U. S. students in the 1970s. More late(a) data can be ensn be in Daniel M. Koretz ( 1987). Modest shed light ons in performanceon standardi zed achievement tests, followed by a leveling off, well beneath peak scores of the early 1960s, characterizes the late 1980s and 1990s. 33 34 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW authority of the semi backstage sector is at the forefront of he policy debate and recent policy initiatives. The modern scotch case for vouchers and increased educational choice was made by Milton Friedman (1962). The academic educational and political-science professions have since dish outed the pros and cons of voucher systems and educational choice (John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, 1978 Myron Liberman, 1989 John Chubb and Terry Moe, 1990). Economic digest of the interaction between public and cloistered schools, and of link policy instrumentslike vouchers, is besides beginning to emerge. This paper continues the study of the market for ducation by developing a warning that focuses on the interactionbetween the public and private educational sectors and also pick ups the consequences of vouchers. We describe the proportionality characteristics of the market for education with an open-enrollmentpublic sector and a competitive private sector. Our role theoretical account embodies two key elements of the educational process. First, students differ in their abilities. Higher ability is assumed to increase a students educational achievement and that of colleagues in the school accompanied. Second, house leads differ in their incomes, with high(prenominal) income increasing the regard for educational achievement.A studentin our model is past characterizedby an ability and a family income, a take out from a continuous bivariate distri andion. A schools quality is determined by the hateful ability of the student body, reflecting the models confederate-groupeffect. We characterizethe counterweight diffusionof studenttypes across public and private schools and examine the tuition structure of private schools, assuming that student types atomic number 18 verifiable. We d evelop a theoretical and computational model in parallel, with the last mentioned calibrated to existing estimates of debate values. Equilibria are simulated for a range of voucher values.Key characteristicsof an sense of equilibriumare the adjacent. A hierarchyof school qualities go away be present, with the pitch of (homogeneous) public schools having the lowest-ability consort group and a strict ability-groupranking of private schools. The equilibrium student bodies of schools correspond to a partition of the ability-income-type space of students with MARCH 1998 stratification by income and, in many cases, stratificationby ability. As Figure 1 from our computational model illustrates, type space is thus carved into diagonal cuts with each high slice making up a private schools student body and with the bottom lice comprising the public sector. The blueprintity of demand for a good peer group leads comparatively high-income studentsto cross subsidize the schooling of r elatively high-ability students, producing the latter partition. Private schools attract high-ability, low-income students by offering them tuition discounts, virtuallytimes fellowships. Even with free gateway, schools monetary value remove by income against students who are not on the margin between switching schools. The equilibrium differentiation of schools and economies of exceed in education preclude perfect competition for every type of student.Nevertheless, this price discriminationdoes not amputate the internalization of the peer-group externality by private schools. An equilibrium without a public sector is Paretoefficient given the equilibrium number of schools. Because free public schools do not price the peer-group externality, an equilibriumwith public schools is Pareto inefficient. In the computational model, we enlist a Cobb-Douglas spec of return and educational achievement which incorporatesthe peer-group effect. The parameters are calibrated to U. S. data from sundry(a) sources. We visualise approximate equilibria for voucher alues ranging from $0 to $4,200 per student ($4,222 affects the expenditure per student in public schools in 1988). With no vouchers, the predicted destiny of students in the public sector is 90 percent (the actual value for the United States is 88 percent). As the voucher is increased, the size of and mean ability in the public sector decrease. With a $2,000 voucher, for example, the percentage of students remaining in the public sector alludes 70 percent, and the mean ability declines by 15. 8 percent. 3 The integer number of private schools in our model precludes existence of competitive equilibrium except in special cases.This integer problem and our thought approachare dealed later in the paper. VOL. 88 NO. 1 EPPLE AND ROMANOPRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS contention The entry of private schools and consequent to a greater extent efficient sorting of students across schools caused by vouchers increases sig htly welfare (and achievement) only a little in our computational model, while having vauntinglyr diffusional effects. As we discuss in detail later, the magnitude of the aggregate effect depends on the extent of complementarity of peer ability and own ability in the educational production juncture. in that respect is little empirical designate to guide assessment of the extent of uch complementarity. The voucher increases the premium to ability in private schools. The largest proportionate gains from the voucher indeed pass to low-income, high-ability students. For example, a household with income of $10,000 and student with ability at the 95th percentile has a welfare gain of about 7. 5 percent of income from a $2,000 voucher. Students of low income and low ability who remain in the public sector when a $2,000 dollar voucher is available experience small welfare losses but make up a majority. It bears emphasizing that our model takes public and private schools to be equal ly powerful providers of education, however.Some argue that private schools are more productive and that the competitive effect of a voucher weapons platform willing increase public-school tellingness. 4 For example, Hoxby (1996) concludes from her empirical investigation that competition-induced performance improvement would increase public-school achievement by more than enough to offset 4 Caroline M. Hoxby (1994, 1996) provides evidence thatprivate-school competition increasespublic-school trenchantness. William N. Evans and Robert M. Schwab (1995) find that Catholic private schools are more in effect(p) in inducing studentsto complete high school and also to attend college.These studies take on the challenge of finding instrumentsthat predict well private-school attendance while being freelance of unobserved determinants of educational achievement. Controversy exists concerning the quality of the instruments used. travel to Thomas J. Kane ( 1996) for a discussion of Hox bys methodology. David N. Figlio and Joe A. Stone ( 1997) pursue a different set of instrumentsthan Evans and Schwab and find that, at currentinput levels, religious private schools are less effective than public schools in producing achievement on standardizedexams in math and science but nonreligious private schools are more effective). See Witte (1996) and Figlio and Stone (1997) for references to an early(a)(prenominal) studies. 35 losses of the magnitude thiatemerge due to reduced peer quality in our computational model. Our analysis delineates the allocative effects of vouchers and demonstrates a potential for significant redistribution. A theoretical-economics lit on education is beginning to emerge. Charles A. M. de Bartolome ( 1990) develops a two resemblancemodel of the provision of public educational inputs (quality) with two ability types and peer-group externalities. He shows hat the voting/locational equilibrium is inefficient because the median value voter does not internalize the consequences of migration on peer groups in choosing the input level. No nonsymbiotic income variability characterizes students in his model. Raquel Fernandez and Richard Rogerson (1996) introduce income differences in a two-neighborhood model of the provision of inputs but abstractfrom peergroup effects. They examine the effects of redistributive policies and direct controls on inputs. N any model has a private sector. Our analysis is differentiated by its consideration of a private sector and its two-dimensional, ontinuous type space. In a nolrnativeanalysis of student groupings in the presence of peergroup effects, RichardArnott and John Rowse ( 1987) show how a social plannerwould maximize the sum of achievements in allocating students of various abilities across classrooms. We analyze equilibrium outcomes, and most of our analysis is positive. Joseph E. Stiglitz ( 1974), Norman J. Ireland (1990), Ben Eden (1992), Charles F. Manski (1992), Michael Rothschild an d Lawrence J. White (1995), Epple and Romano (1996), and GerhardGlomm and B. Ravikumar(1998) consider the consequences of a private sector for education. Stiglitz,Glomm and Ravikumnar, and Epple and Romano are concerned with the existence and properties of voting equilibria over taxfinanced, public-school expenditure in the presence of a private alternative. Ireland analyzes the effects of vouchers on utilities and the quality of the public alternative,taking the tax rate as exogenous. Individuals differ only by income, and the private alternative can be purchased continuously in all these analyses. Hence, the private sector is relatively passive, and issues of fiscal attend to and differences in 36 MARCH 1998 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW studentability across schools do not arise.Our model is distinguished by having differences in ability and related peer-group effects, and by providing an active role for private-sector schools. Eden ( 1992) analyzes vouchers in a purely private mar ket system of provision of education having two ability types and peergroup effects. A voucher equal to the difference between the social and private benefit of education to each ability type is shown to induce socially optimum provision of education. Key differences in our analysis include our consideration of the interaction between the public and private sectors, our exploration of the implications of continuous ifferences in ability and income, and our anxiety to positive issues. Manski ( 1992) pursues a computational analysis of vouchers that also considers peer-group effects among other persuasions of education (especially various objectives of public-school decision makers). Our models differ in a number of charges. Most importantly, we reserve private schools to discriminate in their tuition policies, with many consequences. Rothschild and White ( 1995) analyze a competitive model with consumers also inputs to production (a peer-group effect), victimisation higher educ ation as their primary example.We share a concern for market determine in the presence of an externality. Differences in our model, among others, are the presence of a public sector, a more detailed specification of peer effects and demand for education, and student variation in both ability and household income. Our attention to the implications for pricing, networkability, and school qualities of a peer-group effect deriving from student abilities, the allocation of students according to ability and household income and the related distribution of educational benefits, and the effects of vouchers are not concerns in Rothschild and White.Private schools are cases of clubs with nonanonymous crowd due to the abilitydependent externality and schools power to price it. Suzanne Scotchmer (1994) provides an excellent synthesis of this literature. We follow this literaturein our competitive specification of private schools as supercharge discussed below. The next section presents the model. Section II develops the theoretical results. The computational results comprise Section III. Concluding remarks follow. An adjunct contains some of the detail. I. The Model Household income is pertaind y, and each household has a student of ability b. The joint arginal distributionof ability and income in the population is denoted f(b, y) and is assunmedto be continuous and positive on its . (0, bmax X (0, YmaxAll students support, S attend a school since we assume that free public schooling is preferredto no schooling. The household decision makers utility do work, U( ), is increasing in numeraireconsumption and the educational achievement of the households student, and it is continuous and twice differentiable in both arguments. Achievement, a = a (0, b), is a continuous and increasing black market of the students ability and the mean ability of the student body in the school be,O. Let Ytdenote after-taxincome and The influence of ability on own educational achieveme nt is well put down and not controversial. Eric Hanushek( 1986) provides an excellent retrospect. In the economics literature, Anita A. Summers and Barbara L. Wolfe (1977) and Vernon Henderson et al. (1978) find significant peer-group effects. Evans et al. (1992) adjust for pick bias in the formationof peer groups and show that it eliminates the significance of the peer group in explaining teenage pregnancy and dropping out of school. They are careful to elevation out that their results should not be interpretedas suggesting that peer-groupeffects do not xist, but as demonstrating that scientific proof of those effects is inadequate. Note, too, that their work supports the notion that peer-group variables enter the utility office since a selection process does take place. The psychology literatureon peer-group effects in education also contains some controversy. In their survey paper, Richard L. Moreland and John M. Levine (1992) conclude The fact that good students benefit fro m ability grouping, whereas poor students are harmedby it, suggests that the mean level of ability among classmates, as well as variability in their ability levels, could be an importantfactor.The results from several recent studies . . supportthis notion. This squares with our reading of the literature(Summers e and Wolfe, 1977 Henderson. t al. , 1978 Chen-Lin Kulik and James A. Kulik, 1982, 1984 Aage B. Sorensen, 1984 VOL. 88 NO. I EPPLE AND ROMANOPRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS competitor p tuition expenditure, the latter equal to goose egg if a public school is attended. Thus, U = U(Y, p, a(O, b)), with U1, U2, a,, and a2 all positive. The achievement function enthralls the peer-group effect in our model, discussed further below. To maintain simplicity and highlight the role of peer groups, a chools quality is determined exclusively by the mean ability of its peer group. 6In ongoing work we are ex incline the model to include variation in educational inputs. U is also assumed to ful fill everywhere the integrity-crossing considerateness (SCI) (1) 0a OU/0 J yt ?. Preferences for school quality might also depend on ability. We say penchants satisfy weak single crossing in ability if a Sorensen and MaureenT. Hallinan, 1986 Adam Gamoran and Mark Berends, 1987 Jennie Oakes, 1987 Gamoran, 1992). However, at that place are alternative interpretations (Robert E. Slavin, 1987, 1990). For simplicity, the possibility that dispersion in peer ability also affects achievement is not reinforced into our model. Roland Benabou (1996b) explores the consequences for economic growth of dispersion in human capital. 7 We believe this to be uncontroversial. hile we know W of no empirical studies that use direct measures of educational quality, a substantial empirical literature on the demand for educationalexpenditureexists. Although considerable diversity in magnitudes of estimates of the income ginger nut of demand for educational spending are present, estimates victimisatio n a variety of approaches find the ncome elasticity to be positive (Daniel Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro, 1989). 8 Households may consider education a consumption good, an investment good, or a combination of the two. Our formulation can be interpretedto deem any of these motives. However, for households not subject to borrowing constraints, a pure investment motive would imply a cipher income elasticity of demand. For such households, this in turn would imply that the SCI pin down in (1) would be only weakly satisfied. In light of the empir- OU/00 / Ob t OUIOyt which implies a weakly positive ability elasticity of demandfor quality.However, because the pertinent empirical evidence is mixed and scarce, we postpone restricting preferences in this regard until obligatory. 9 In our computational model and to illustrateour more general theoretical results, we adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification of the utility function (2) Hence, for students of the same ability, any indifference carou se in the (0, p)-plane of a higher-income household cuts any indifference curve of a lower-income household from below. This see to it corresponds to an income elasticity of demand for educational quality that is positive at all qualities for all types. One set of sufficient conditions on U for SCI is U11 0 and U12 2 0, with at to the lowest power point I one having strict in equality. 8 37 U = (yt-p)a(O, a(O, b) b) = 0Yb6 g O y O. While(2) satisfiesSCI,it embodies he neut tral assumption of zero ability elasticity of demand at O? /0 9b 0. Our computational results are not driven by own-ability effects on the demand for education. Keep in mind, too, that the theoretical results do not assume specification (2). A schools apostrophize depend only on the number of students it enrolls, since inputs interpolate only with size. All schools, public and private,have the simple cost function (3)C(k) = V(k) + F V 0 Vo ical evidence suggesting the income elasticity to be positive, we co nserve space in the development that follows by assuming that SCI is strict for all households. 9 Henderson et al. (1978) find no interaction between own ability and the benefits to an improved peer group, gibe to 2IU/00&b= 0 in our model. Summers and Wolfe ( 1977) find some supportfor higherpeer-group benefits to lower-ability students, that is, 02U/la6ab 0. Thus the literatureprovides limited evidence from which to draw conclusions. 38 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW where k denotes the number of attendstudents.Technical differencesamong schools are not an element of our model (for simplicity). Hence, vouchers cannot drive technically inefficient schools from the market,an effect predicted by some proponents of vouchers (see footnote4). Let k* denotethe efficient home base, (4) k* ARGMINC(k)/k. The presumptionof some economies of scale in education is practical(prenominal) (Lawrence Kenny, 1982) and important. Otherwise, the private market would produce an infinite number of school s containing infinitely refined peer groups. Our models equilibriumwill be invariable with the fact thatthe numberof types of studentsgreatlyexceeds the numberof schools.Public-sector schools offer free gate to all students. This open-enrollment policy leads to homogeneous public schools in equilibrium because we assume no frictions in public-school choice are present. Without equalization of 0s in public-sector schools, students would migrate to higher-0 schools to reap the benefits of a better peer group. With equalized 0s, no incentives for switching schools within the public sector remain. We study the alternative of neighborhood school systems that impose residence requirementsin Epple and Romano (1995). Since all public schools will have the same , one can think of the public sector as consisting of one (possibly large) school. Publicsector schooling is financed by a proportional income tax, t, compensable by all households, whether or not the households child attends schoo l in the public sector. Thus, Yt= (1 t)y. The public sector chooses the (integer) number of schools and their sizes to minimize the total cost of providing schooling subjectto (3). The tax rate adjuststo balance the bud stand by. Because households are atomistic, in that respect is no tax consequence to a households decision about school attendance. The public finance of chooling can then be largely suppressedin the analysis until the consideration of vouchers. The public sector is passive in this model for simplicity. Public-sector schools do not segment students by ability (track), increase educational inputs to compete more effectively with the private sector, or behave strategically MARCH 1998 in any sort. More realistic alternativesare importanttopics for research, some of which are discussed in the final section. Private-sectorschools maximize get, and there is free entry anidexit. 10Modeling private schools as choosing an price of entry policy and uitionpolicy is conve nient andinvolves no loss of generality. Student types are observable, implying that tuition and admission can be conditioned on ability and income as competition permits. 1 Private schools are an example of clubs with non-anonymous crowding (Scotchmer and Myrna H. Wooders, 1987 Scotchmer, 1997) because of the peer-groupeffect, and we model private-schoolbehavior sideline the literature on competitive club economies. In particular,private schools maximize loot as utility tak-ers(see Scotchmer, 1994), a generalization of price-taking when consumers (types) and productsdiffer. Private chools believe they can attract any studenttype by offering admission at a tuition yielding at least the maximum utility the student could obtain elsewhere. Let an i substandard, i = 1, 2, .. n, indicate a value for the ith private school. A zero subscript does the same for the public school. Let pi (b, y) denote the tuition necessary to enter school i, with po(b, y) = 0 V (b, y). Let ai (b, y) C 0, 1 denote the proportionof type (b, y) in the population that school i admits, 10Consideration of alternative objective functions to profitmaximization is reasonable,especially given the significant proportion of nonprofit schools.Some private pursuethe objective of quality schools might, for exa-mnple, maximization. forest maximization, like profit maximization, is a member of a set of objective functions that are utility independent in the sense that they place no weight on offering any student types higher utility than the students (equilibrium) reservation utility. Our preliminary analysis of this issue suggests that equilibtia where some private schools pursue objectives from this set other than profit maximization must also be competitive equilibria. Roughly, the failure of any school to maximize profits would permit ently by a profit-maximizingschool. The notion is that abilities can be determinedthrough testing, and required financial disclosures permit determination of househ old income. At least in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility, equation (2), students will have no incentive to underperformon exams, since tuition will be nonincreasing in ability in equilibrium (proved in Epple and Romano 1993). bonus compatibility in the reporting of income is more complex. EPPLE AND ROMANOPRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION VOL. 88 NO. I with any ao(b, y) E 0, 1 optimal for the public school as determinedby the residualdemand for public education.A private schools profit-maximizationproblem can be written as (5) ooze rri Oj,kj,pj(b,y),aj(b,y) pi(b, y)ai (b, y) f s X f(b, y) db dy-V(ki) F subject to ai (b, y) E 0, 1 V (b, y) (5a) (5b) (b, y)a(Oi, U(y,-pi sludge 2 j b) ) p1(b, y), a(0j, b)) j * i aj(b,y) O is in the optimal set of j U(yt I0,1, ,n that (5b) hold for all (b, y) as we have specified (i. e. , including for nonadmitted students). Tuition charged to students for whom ai (b, y) = 0 is school is only optimal choice (i. e. , nonadmittedstudents) is irrelevan t. Note, too, that tuition such that (5b) holds with strict quality will be optimal. Private schools enter so long as they expect to make positive profits as utility takers. Because officer private schools maximize profitsas utility takers,entryresults if and only if wri 0 for some incumbent school. The public-sector/private-sectorequilibriumis described by the following five conditions in addition to the government balanced-budget condition presented below in Section II, subsection C, for the more general case with vouchers. Condition UM U*(b, y) MAX U(y,-pi(b, V (b, y) 39 ie E 0,1, ,nI ai(b,y) y), a(0i, b)) O is in the optimal set of iV (b, y). (5c) (b, y)f(b, y) db dy ki =fai Condition get-up-and-go s Oi, ki, pi(b, y), ai (b, y) satisfy (5), (Sd) O kjfbai(b, y)f(b, y) db dy. s Constraints(5c) and (5d) define, paying attentionively, the size of the schools student body and the mean ability. Constraint (5a) precludes a school from admitting a negative number of a type or more of a type than exits in the population. 2Constraint(5b) imposes the utilitytaking assumption. Students alternatives are limited to schools where they are admitted. Students always have the option of attending the public school. It is innocuous to require i= 1,2, ,n.Condition ZfH 7ri = 0 i = 1, 2, , n. Conditions PSP po(b, y) = V (b, y) ao(b, y) E 0, 1 V (b, y) 12 One might object to the presumptionthat competitive schools recognize the limit to demand. The presumption is analogous to a monopolistically competitive firms recognition of a limit on its demand curve. Dropping the presumptionwould lead to schools admitting infinite densities of some types. See Scotchmer (1994) for the analogue in the literatureon club goods. ao(b, y)f (b, y) db dy ko= s Go =-Af ko bao(b, y)f (b, y) db dy. s THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW 40 Condition MC n xai (b,y)=1 V(b,y). i=OCondition UM summarizes household utility maximization. Households choose a mostpreferred private or public school, taking admissio n/tuition policies, school qualities, and taxes as given. earnings maximization of private schools (VIM) and the public-sector policies (PSP) have been discussed. While the entry assumption in a higher place is formally part of the translation of equilibrium, it is convenient to substitute the implication that private schools must earn zero profits (ZH). The last condition is market clearance, which uses the simplifying assumption above that free public schooling is preferredto no schooling.II. Theoretical esults R A. resolving to the Private Schools Problem Using UM, the first-order conditions for problem (5) can be written as follows U(yt- pi , a(Oi, b)) (6a) =U*(b, ai (b, y) (6b) piC as f (6c) We now turn to the properties of equilibrium, assuming one exists. Existence issues are discussed below. Heuristic argumentshave been substituted for formal proofs when reasonable. The first result concerns the qualities of schools. b0,db (b, si) L sho0 V(ki) yd 0 +io (Oi b) = n7i- X PROPOSITION 1 A strict hierarchy of school qualities results, with the public sector V (b y) i i J ith equality combined with the equilibrium condition UM pe () is student-type (b, y)s reservation price for attending school of quality 0i. Condition (6b) characterizes optimal admission policies. The term 77i0i b) may ( be thoughtof as the fringycost of admission operating via the peer-group externality in school i. From (6c), 77ithe Lagrangianmultiplier on (5d) equals the per-studentrevenue change in school i deriving from a change in 0i. The appropriatelyscaled change in 0i due to admitting student of ability b equals (b t 0k) its negative is then multiplied by rqj o obtain the peer-externalitycost.The peer cost of admitting students with ability below the schools mean is positive because the resulting quality decline dictates reduced tuition to all students, while the peer cost of admitting above-mean-ability students is negative. Let ( MCi (b) V(ki ) + r7i 0 b), which we term effective borderline cost. Types with reservation prices below MCi (b) are not willing to pay enough to cover their effective borderline cost and are not admitted. The school admits all of a type that has a reservationprice above effective fringy cost, and any ai E 0, 1 is optimal if pi* = MCi. 1 B. Properties of EquilibriumV (b, y) y) MARCH 1998 ai(b y) f(b y) db dy Condition ( 6a) describes sclhooli s optimnalut ition function, Pi* (b, y, Oi) and is just (5b) 3 Results (6b) and (6c) are found by substituting p* from (6a) into (5), and then forming a Lagrangianfunction to take account of (Sc) aind(Sd). Result (6b) is then derived by pointwise optimization over ai while taking account of the constraint (Sa). 4 In the upper and lower lines of (6b), the solution for ai is at a corner, and the first-orderconditions are also sufficient for a local maximum. In the middle line of (6b), where p * MCI and any ac (b, y) E 0, 11 satisfies the irst-orderconditions, V sufficiently large imp lies local maximization. VOL. 88 NO. 1 EPPLE AND ROMANOPRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION having the lowest-ability peer group 0,, fJn-I .. fJI 00. Formal proof is in the Appendix. Here an economic interpretationis provided. All private schools must be of higher peer quality than schools in the public sector. Otherwise, no students would be willing to pay to attend any private school. Why must a strict hierarchy of private schools characterize equilibrium? If two private schools were of the same quality, then they would compete perfectly for students.Consequently, they would have the same effective marginal costs of admitting all types, and their tuitions (to all admitted students) would equal effective marginal costs. An opportunity to increase profits would exist by varying admissions/tuitions in such a way to either (a) increase quality and admit a student body that values quality by more, or (b) decrease quality and admit a student body that values quality by less. In eithe r case, the school differentiates itself in quality, at the same time attractinga student body that permits utile price discrimination over the quality change.We sketch the example of a profitablequality improvement, beginning with schools having identical student bodies (the proof shows that this is without loss of generality). Let one school admit the same numberof (b2, Y2) types as it expels of (bl, yl) types, where b2 b, and Y2 Yl, implying an increase in 0 but no change in production costs, V(k) + F. Further, choose the types (which is always executable) such that Y2 YI b2 bi by enough that, using SCI, the (b2, Y2)-types value increased quality by more than the (bl, Yi)types, even though their abilities differ.This permits the school to charge the newly admitted students tuitions higher than their effective marginal costs because they are selected to value quality increases by more than the expelled students. The profit increase follows because the new student body value s the quality increase by more than would the original student body 0 and rl rise in the school. It would not increase profits to substitute students in such a way that 0 rises without also changing the student bodys average value of quality improvements, because tuitions equal 41 ffective marginal costs in the initially nondifferentiated schools. 5 This example assumes that a school substitutes students to increase quality, but alternativeprofitablesubstitutions exist that decrease quality, roughly, by also creating a lower-income studentbody. In either case, the argumentdepends on SCI. It also identifies the models force for diagonal stratification (see the examples in Figure 1). As developed more richly below, this stratification results because students having relatively high income and low ability within a school cross subsidize relatively lowincome, high-ability students.The strict hierarchy of Proposition 1 supports the equity-relatedconcerns of some that private schools op erate to the detriment of public schools by siphoning off higher-ability students. Whethera strict hierarchyis efficient is analyzed below. First we develop furtherthe positive properties of equilibrium. Proposition 2 describes equilibriumpricing, and Proposition 3 describes the resulting partition of types. Some definitions are useful. Let (b, y) E SIai (b, y) 0 is optimal denote the admission space of school i, i = 0, 1, , n (see Figure 1, for example). A venue of points (b,y) E A. n Aj, i j, assuming t exists, is referredto as a boundary locus between i and. (Boundary loci have zero measure in S, as proved in Epple and Romano 1993. ) Since any household prefers free public schooling to no schooling, the entire type space S is partitioned into admission spaces. Last, to avoid tedious qualification of statements for public-sector schools, we specify that MCo -0 for all (b, y). This notation is convenient since students see a zero cost of public education. PROPOSITION 2 (i) On a boundary locus between school i and j, pi MCi(b) and pj = MCj(b) pricing on boundary loci is strictly according to ability in private schools. ii) pi (b, y) MCi (b) for off-boundarystudents who attend private school i pricing off- Mathematically,beginning with equal Os,first-order effects on profits of varying admissions vanish, but the profit function is convex in some directions in a(b, y), p(b, y) -space, allowing a profit increase. 42 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW boundary loci depends on income in private schools. (iii) Every student attends a school that would maximize utility if all schools instead set pi equal to equilibrium MCi Jor all students. The allocation is as though effective marginal cost pricing prevails in private schools. 16See Epple and Romano (1993) for proof. Competition between private schools that share a boundary locus forces prices to effective marginalcosts for student-typeson the locus. These students are indifferentto attending the schools sharing the l ocus. Private schools then have no power to price discriminatewith respect to income on boundaryloci. Prices are, however, adjusted to differing abilities because private schools internalize the peergroup effect. Tuition to private school i decreases with ability at rate rRialong its boundary loci, reflecting the value of peergroup improvements of the schools student body.Moving wrong a boundarylocus in a private schools admission space, students preferences change in such a way that they would strictly prefer the school attended if it practiced effective marginal-cost pricing. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 establishes that private schools exploit this by increasing price. These students are also indifferent between the private school attended or their best alternative by (6a), but this is a result of discriminatory pricing. Generally, then, price depends both on ability and income within admission spaces. 7 Part (iii) of Proposition 2 follows because it is profitable for a private sc hool to be sure o attractany student whose reservation price 16 The statementsregard the equilibriumeffective marginal cost. Income effects would cause these costs to change if tuition equaled effective marginal cost for all students. This has distributional (but not efficiency) implications. 7 While there are no published studies of the allocation of financial aid by income and ability among private elementary and secondary schools, there is evidence on the allocation of financial aid by colleges and universities. There the evidence is that both ability and family income are significant determinantsof whether and how much financial aid is received (J.Brad Schwartz, 1986 Sandra R. Baum and Saul Schwartz, 1988 Charles T. Clotfelter, 1991). MARCH 1998 exceeds the schools effective marginal cost. The student allocations link to effective marginal costs, and hence abilities, will be shown to be efficient (except for the public sector). The income-related price discrimination that occurs does not part the allocation consistent with effective marginal-cost pricing rather,it is purely redistributive. While this income-related price discrimination is of the first degree (a la Pigou), its magnitude is limited by competition for students among the differentiatedschools.Near a boundaryin a schools admission space, a students preference for the school attended would be slight under effective marginal-cost pricing, so that the admitting school can capture little rent. The numberand sizes of private schools then determine their powier to price discriminate over income. All private schools have student bodies less than k* by a similar argumentto that in more standardmonopolistically competitive equilibria. 8Here school is marginal-revenuecurve can be constructed by ordering from highest to lowest students reservation prices minus peer costs i. e. , p* + rbi(b Of), and thus the associated ownward-slopingaverage revenue curve may be derived. Zero profits then implies a scale below k*. If we let k* decline, then private schools become more numerous and less differentiated (have closer 0s), and incomerelated price discriminationdeclines. Now consider the partition of types into schools. We say stratificationby income (SBI) holds if, for any two households having students of the same ability, one households choice of a higher-O school implies it has a weakly higher income than the other household. Analogously, stratification by ability (SBA) is present if, holding income fixed, the household that chooses a higher-Oschool must ave a student of weakly higher ability. The combination of SBI and SBA implies a diagonalized partitionas, for example, in Figure 1. PROPOSITION 3 (i) SBI characterizes equilibrium. (ii) If preferences satisfy weak c single crossing in ability (W-SCB) and m7, 18 The points made here are proved in Epple and Romano (1993). EPPLE AND ROMANOPRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION VOL. 88 NO. I ?72 ? - ? 71, then SBA also characterizes equilib rium. 9 To confirm part (i), consider two households with students of the same ability but dif- feringincomes y2 yI. In the (0, p) -plane, indifference curves of a household are up(a) loping. For the same ability, SCI implies that any indifference curve of y2 cuts any indifference curve of yl from below. Allocations are as if tuitions equal effective marginal costs part (iii) of Proposition 2. Thus, the choice between schools i andj may be representedin the ( 0, p ) -plane as a choice between ( Oi, MCi (b)) and (0j, MCj(b)). If Oj Oi, it must be that MCj(b) MCi (b) if either type chooses i. A standard single-crossing argument then applies to complete the proof. Part (ii) is proved in the Appendix here we provide some intuition. Assume first that the demand for quality is independent of ability (e. . , as in the Cobb-Douglas specification) and that all private schools give the same discount to ability along their boundary loci (i. e. , schools 7s are the same). Holding nominal hou sehold income fixed, real income would rise with student ability due to tuition discounts at all private schools. SBA would then result by the same logic explaining SBI. Hence, the combination of a positive income elasticity (SCI) and discounts to ability alone would cause both SBI and SBA, the diagonalized partition as in Figure 1. relationally high-income and lowability students cross subsidize relatively low-income and high-ability students in rivate schools. The argument holds more strongly if the 7s strictly ascend or if WSCB holds strictly. However, neither condition is necessary for SBA, nor do any of our other results require these conditions or SBA. It may be possible absent these conditions to get cases having nonmonotonic boundary loci in the (b, y) -plane. 20 9 We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to investigate bid-rentfunctions (see e. g. , MasahisaFujita, 1989), which ultimately led to part (ii) of Proposition 3. 20 The alternativeto W-SCB implies that lo wer-ability types are willing to pay more for a better peer group, and he alternativeto weakly wage increase qs implies that lower- 43 We now turnto normativeresults which are kind of intuitive. Again, see Epple and Romano (1993) for the formal analysis. Pareto efficiency requires (i) a student allocation that internalizes the peer-group externality given the nmtmberf schools, and (ii) entry as long o as aggregate household net willingness to pay for an allocation with one more school exceeds the change in all schools costs. An equilibrium without a public sector would satisfy condition (i) but not condition (ii). Effective marginal cost includes the marginal value of he peer group externality, implying that MCi (b) equals the social marginal cost of attendance at school i by a student of ability b. A purely private-school equilibrium then satisfies efficiency condition (i) by part (iii) of Proposition 2. However, entry to the point of zero profits entails externalities so that ef ficient entry condition (ii) fails to hold in a fully private equilibrium. An entrantcapturesthe full value of its product to the studentbody it admits but ignores utility changes of nonadmitted students and profit changes of other schools resulting from the reallocation. Fixed costs, quality schools give bigger discounts to ability. Either would tend to work against pure ability stratification, though Proposition I implies that some degree of ability stratificationwould be present. It is desirable to demonstrate SBA without assuming lift qs, since these values are endogenous. However, providing general primitive conditions for SBA independentof assumptionsconcerning the equilibrium qs is difficult, because their equilibrium values depend on the entire distribution of types in the population. For the Cobb-Douglas case and ssuming independence of income and ability in the population, we (Epple and Romano, 1993) have shown SBA without assuming weakly ascending 7s. 21 The comparison of the equilibrium number of schools in a fully private equilibrium to the Paretoefficient number entails a trade-off. The entrant ignores the lost revenues and cost savings to other schools from the students that t admits. Since almost every student ati tracted away from incumbent schools is inframarginal (i. e. , tuition exceeds effective marginal cost), the net effect here of entry is negative, tending to cause too much entry.Opposing this is the entrants failure to capture the full returnsfrom increased varie-tyof school qualities that results. Altlhoughthe entrant fully price discriminates to the students it admits, it cannot tax other students for the adjustments in the incumbent schools qualities. A net benefit to other students is credibly to result because the incumbent schools will better accommodate preferences. 44 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW hence the finite size of an entrant,underlie the entry externalities as in many models of monopolistic competition. Introductionof the free public sector implies eviations from both efficiency conditions. In general, the public sector displaces multiple differentiatedprivate schools, substitutingthe equivalent of one large homogeneous school. This effective reduction in the number of schools is without attention to costs and benefits, in general implying a deviation from efficiency condition (ii). Holding fixed the number of schools in the public-private equilibrium (and counting the public sector as one school), zero pricing of public schooling violates condition (i). By just reallocating students between the public sector and private school 1 near their shared oundary locus, Paretian gains are feasible. Reference to the upper panel of Figure 1 from our computational equilibrium may help clarify the argument. Gains would result from shifting into private school I relatively lowerability students below but near the boundary locus, students for whom the marginal social cost in the public sector is positive. The se students are nearly indifferent between the two schools when facing the social cost of attending the private school but a tuition (zero) below the social cost of attending the public school. Students near the boundary locus and ttending the private school may also be of sufficiently high ability that the social cost of attending the public school is negative. Gains from shifting such studentsinto the public sector are then also feasible. Such students exist in our computational model, the rough prescriptionbeing to rotatethe boundarylocus counterclockwise at the point of ability having zero social marginal cost in the public school. Collecting these results, we have the following proposition. efficient. (ii) The public-private-sector equilibrium has neither an efficient number of schools, nor an efficient student allocation iven the number of schools. When fixed costs of schooling are small, the departure from efficiency in a fully private equilibrium will be correspondingly smal l. Part (i) of Proposition 4 can then be interpreted as making a case for private schooling and the vouchers we study. However, we have some reservations concerning this efficiency result. First, we are freehearted to the view of many that access to a quality education is a right and serves as a means to limit historical inequities. Second, longer-run externalities from education not considered by private schools, like reduced crime, may be present.For these reasons, we explore the consequences of vouchers on all types instead of just providing aggregate measures. A somewhat distinguishable concern arises because exact equilibrium exists only in special cases. The interpretationof the efficiency results in the approximateequilibriumwe study is discussed in subsection D, below. C. Vouchers We examine tax-financedcash awardsto all those attending private school. 22 No role for vouchers is present in the tuition-free public t sector. Refo-rmulate he model by everywhere adding the amo unt of the voucher, v, to yt for households that choose a private school.The governments budget constraintis tyf (b, y) db dy (7) s This positive externality will tend to cause too little entry. We believe that too many or too few private schools are possible, but we have not proved this. vf(b,y)dbdy fJ PROPOSITION 4 (i) The allocation in a fuilly private equilibrium is (Pareto) efficient given the number of schools the equilibrium number of schools is not, however, generally MARCH 1998 . U AlU UA2U . +srs N U . +r , / B 7(k 22 Our model permits households to retain as income any excess of the voucher amount over the tuition paid to he private school of choice, thereby avoiding considerable complication. VOL. 88 NO. 1 45 EPPLE AND ROMANOPRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION where N and k denote, respectively, the costminimizing number and size of schools in the public sector that satisfy demandfor public education. Vouchers lower the real price of private education and increase the de mand for it. We examine the effects of vouchers in our computationalmodel. the results will provide at least suggestive evidence about the uphold of policy interventions. However, scant empirical evidence exists on some important parameters of the odel. D. Existence of Equilibriumand an ApproximateEquilibrium We require specifications for the stringency of income and ability, the utility and achievement functions, and the cost function for education. As we discuss in the Appendix, exact equilibrium generally fails to exist due to the integer number of private schools. We examine an approximate equilibrium in our computational analysis. Our epsilon-competitive equilibrium requires that no (utility-taking) private school, incumbentor entrant,could increase profitsby more than s. Let 7rax and .. min denote the maximum and minimum profits arned by incumbent schools which maximize profits overp(b, y) and a (b, y) locally, and replace Zfl in the definitionof equilibrium with MAX irmax, Xrmax -lrmin rminl c Here lrmax equals the maximum potential profits to an entrant,and the maximum of the second two terms in the brackets equals the largest feasible profit increase by an incumbent school. The revised definition of equilibrium continues to require UM, PSP, MC, and local profit maximization by incumbent private schools i. e. , (6a) (6c). Last, the number of private schools is the minimum number satisfying these requirements.The epsilon equilibriumretains all the positive propertiesof an exact equilibriumexcept that private schools could gain s in profits via global adjustments. The allocation of students in a fully private equilibriumwould then continue to satisfy efficiency condition (i). M III. computational quilibrium odeland E R Illustrative esults We develop a computationalmodel to illustrate our results, to examine vouchers, and to explore issues for which comparative-static analysis may yield ambiguous results. We calibrate it to existing empirical evidence so that A. Specification and CalibrationWe assume that n (b) is distributedbivar- iate normal with mean LbJand covariance matrix 2 01b P UbUy P bUy aY J To calibratethe distributionof income, we use mean ($36,250) and median ($28,906) income for households from U. S. census datafor 1989. With units of income in thousands of dollars, these imply that ,uy = 3. 36 and ay = 0. 68. We adopt specification (2) for the combined utility-achievement function. To calibrate the ability distribution we presume that educational achievement determines futureearnings and that the bench markeconomy is in a steady state. First, define normed achievement, aN, s our achievement function raised to the power 1/3 and multiplied by a unalterable, aN Y Ka = KO lb. 23 Then, a studentwith ability b attending a school with a peer quality of 0 is presumedto have futureannualearnings (E) given by ln E = ln aN= In K + (y/o/)ln 0 + ln b. This normalization is such that a percentage change in ability leads to th e same percentage change in dollars earned. Henderson et al. ( 1978) reportthe change in achievement percentile that results from moving students from classes stratified by ability to mixed 23 The constant of proportionality, K, is arbitrary. A onvenient scaling is to set K = E b -. This scaling has the propertythat, if all students in the populationwere to attend the same school (i. e. , 0 = Eb), then normed achievement would equal ability (i. e. , aN = b). 46 THE AMERICANECONOMICREVIEW classes. An elasticity of achievement with respect to peer ability that is 30 percent as large as the elasticity with respect to own ability is representative of the results they report. We adopt the somewhat conservativevalue of y/l 0. 2. To complete the calibration of the distribution of ability, we then assume that the observed household-income distributionis the ncome distribution that emerges in a steadystate equilibrium in our benchmark model. 24 This yields Ilb = 2. 42 and b = 0. 61. Thus, me an and median ability are 13. 6 and 11. 3, respectively, and the standard deviation of ability is 9. 1. 25 GarySolon (1992) and David J. Zimmerman (1992) provide evidence on the correlationbea tween fathers income and sons incomrre,nd they both find that the best point estimate of this correlationis approximrately. 4. Intergen0 erationalcorrelationin income arises from two sourcescorrelationbetween householdincome nd student ability and, for given ability, correlation between income and quality of school attended. Hence, SBI suggests that the intergenerationalcorrelationin incomes is an upper bound on the correlationbetween parents income and childs ability. For purposes of sensitivity analysis, we then assume that p E 0, 0. 4. For our benchmarkcase, we set p = 0, More precisely, we let the distribution of ability be lognormal, and we approximateby assuming that this generates a lognormal distributionof earnings. We set the first two moments of the distribution of earnings equal to the irst two moments of the distribution of income. That is, a we choose 11h nd cb such that our benchmarkequilibrium has EaN = Eylm and VaraN = Vary/m2. The constantm is the ratio of employed workersper household to the number of students per household (m = 2. 6 in 1990). The distribution of earnings will not be exactly lognormal because of the separate difference in schools attended, even though the distribution of ability is presumed to be lognormal. If every student attended public school in the benchmarkmodel, and hence faced the same 0, earnings would be exactly lognormal.The approximation is a good one because 90 percent of the students do attend public schools as we will see. 25 Ability can be related to IQ. Using IQ X(100, 256), one obtains In b = -1. 38 + 0. 038(IQ). In our novoucher steady state, this implies that a workerwith an IQ of 100 has expected income of $22,074, and a 10-point increase in his IQ increases expected income to $32,510. See the discussion in what f ollows relatingto Figure 6 and the calculation of expected steady-state income conditional on ability. 24 MARCH 1998 which is particularly onvenient for our steadyc state calibrationof the model.This completes the calibrationof f(b, y). We now complete the calibration of preferences. The Cobb-Douglas specification implies one(a) price and income elasticities for school quality, 0. Given the absence of empirical evidence on the demand for quality, these are slick focal values and are consistent with estimates of demand for school expenditure (see e. g. , Theodore Bergstrom et al. , 1982). This function also implies thatthe marginal rate of substitutionbetween school quality and the numeraire is invariant to own ability. Empirical evidence is mixed about whether an improvementin peer group is more eneficial to high- or low-ability students. Hence, our models assumption that the effect of peer group is not biased toward either highor low-ability types seems an appropriate choice for a baseline model. If school quality could be purchasedat a constant price per unit of quality, each households expenditure on education relative to total expenditureon other goods would be y/( 1 + -y). The existing share of aggregate disposable personal income in the United States that is spent on education is approximately 0. 056. Hence, we set y = 0. 06. Using y/P = 0. 2 from above, the calibrated tility-achievement function is then U = (Yt P)0006b0. 30. We chose a cost function that is quadratic in the percentage of students (or households) a school serves F + V(k) = 12 + 1,300k + 13,333k2, with parameters set as follows. Expenditure per student in public schools in 1988 was $4,222 (Statistical Abstract, 1991 p. 434) and there was 1/2studentper household (Statistical Abstract, 1992 pp. 46, 139). We specified our benchmark case to have quaternion private schools and chose parametervalues such that average cost in equilibriumwas approximately$4,200 per pupil. 26 Experimentation in dicated that 6 We have presented the cost function in terms of the percentage of students served or, equivalently, the per- VOL. 88 NO. I EPPLE AND ROMANOPRIVATE-PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMPETITION equilibriumpropertiesare not very sensitive to the benchmark number of schools, but rather are sensitive to the minimum of the average cost of schooling. We set e = 4. 2. This is the minimum value sufficient to assure existence of epsilon equilibrium for voucher values varying from zero to $4,200 per student. 27 B. Results For our benchmark equilibrium with no voucher, the public sector has 90 percent of the student population, and the four private chools combined serve the remainder. The actual U. S. percentage of students enrolled in public schools during this period equaled 88 percent. change magnitude p from 0 to 0. 4 reduces public-sector attendance to 88 percent. Effects on other variables of so changing p are also small, and the results that follow are for p = 0. centage of households serv ed, k. In terms of k, average cost reaches a minimum at $2,100, with k* = 0. 03 $2,100 can then be interpretedas the average cost per household. There are twice as many households as students in the United States. Letting s denote the numberof studentsand ubstituting s = k/2, one sees that the minimum of the average cost per student is $4,200. In our presentation,we focus on per-student measures of tuition and costs the related per-household measures are simply half those of the per-studentvalues. 27 This value is about 7 percent of the cost of a school operating at a scale that minimizes cost per student. Relative to fixed cost, ? is approximately 35 percent. Of course, a minimal E, however measured, is desirable. We have studied how the minimum e varies as we vary efficient school scale, k*, while holding average cost constant.We find that the requisite e to support equilibrium varies approximatelyproportionatelywith k* if fixed cost is varied proportionately with k*. This suggest s, as we would expect, that e can be made as small as desired if k * is made sufficiently small. We have also investigated increasing fixed cost while holding k* and minimum average cost constant. This tends to reduce the ratio of e to fixed cost but increases the unequivocal magnitude of e required to sustain equilibrium. Our investigation reveals that substantive findings from the computational model re not sensitive to the choice of k* or the relative magnitude of fixed to variable cost. Rather, the key aspect of costs is the value of average cost at the minimum, and as discussed in the text, this value is based on observed school costs. The problem with pursuinga calibrationthat further lowers e is that it leads to a computationally unmanageable number of schools for large vouchers. 47 Othercomputationalresults are presentedin Figures 1-6. The upperpanel of Figure 1 presents the boundary loci and admission sets in type space, in addition to the equilibrium Os nd ks. Here and in some other figures, both absolute and percentile ability scales are provided for perspective. The lower panel displays the allocation for a voucher of $1,800. The linear boundary loci derive from the Cobb-Douglas specification. For results we present, intersections of boundaryloci, if any, occur very near the bounds of the support of type space. S